Devon • Cornwall • Isles of Scilly

LRF

Local Resilience Forum

LARGE SCALE EVACUATION AND SHELTER STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

PREPARING FOR EMERGENCIES

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Name	Department	Organisation

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Details of changes should be sent to:

Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Resilience Forum Secretariat

Email lrf@devonandcornwall.pnn.police.uk

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➢ District Councils ➢ Highways Departments ➢ Trading Standards Departments ➢ Adult and Children's Services Departments ➢ Transport Departments	Electronic – Distribution from LA Emergency Planning Teams to cascade to appropriate departments within their own organisations
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Or email – emerplan@devon.gov.uk

Amendments

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Executive Summary

The consequences of a wide scale emergency can be devastating and far reaching.

Regardless of where an event takes place those affected, both directly and indirectly, need to be able to access timely and accurate information, and know that plans are in place to support them in their time of need.

It is the intention of multi-agency partners to provide a strategic framework and operational guidelines to support the evacuation of large numbers of people from place(s) of danger within the Devon, Cornwall, and Isles of Scilly Local Resilience Forum (LRF) area to place(s) of safety elsewhere in that area or, in the event of catastrophic emergency, outside it and into other LRF area(s). The provision of professional help and assistance that is coordinated, consistent and clear, will be delivered as sensitively as is reasonably possible in an event of an evacuation of this magnitude.

This plan has been prepared and will be maintained by Devon County Council (DCC) on behalf of the LRF. The LRF group and secondary stakeholders include multi-agency representation from Category 1 and Category 2 responders, and British Red Cross who represented the voluntary sector. The plan and any subsequent changes will be reviewed by the Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation and Shelter sub-group and endorsed by the LRF.

Comments, requests for further information and copies should be directed to DCC Emergency Planning Service emerplan@devon.gov.uk.

Chair of LRF Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation and Shelter Sub-Group (signature)	**Richard Horne, Emergency Planning Manager Devon County Council**	**Dated**	28 May 2009

Chair of BMG (signature)	**ACC Debbie Simpson, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary**	**Dated**	14 June 2009

1 Overview

1.1 Title and Ownership

This document is entitled the Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly LRF 'Large Scale Evacuation and Shelter Strategic Framework'.

The LRF has the rights of ownership of this document, with publication and distribution being agreed by the LRF members. No amendment, replication or distribution of this framework is permitted without the express agreement of the LRF.

The purpose of the LRF is to ensure effective delivery of those duties under the Act that need to be developed in a multi-agency environment.

1.2 Introduction

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) sets out the generic framework for civil protection in England and Wales and places civil protection duties on specific responders.

The LRF has established a work programme which promotes the cooperation of all Category 1 and Category 2 Responders in order to discharge its functions and duties as required by the CCA, this identifies specific National Capability Work Streams within which 'Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation and Shelter' planning falls.

This plan should be read in conjunction with the statutory guidance 'Emergency Preparedness' and non-statutory guidance 'Emergency Response and Recovery', the complimentary guidance 'Evacuation and Shelter', 'National Resilience Planning Assumptions', and other associated legislative and guidance documents on the UK Resilience Website[1]. It should also be read alongside the LRF's 'Combined Agency Emergency Response Protocol' (CAERP), the SW Regional Response to Large Scale Evacuation, and other interlinking plans falling out of other LRF work streams, such as Warning & Informing, Telecommunications, Flood, Recovery, Mass Fatalities, Mass Casualties, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN). Copies of unrestricted associated plans are available via the LRF Secretariat (see ***Appendix P***) or via links on the LRF website[2].

This framework will be implemented alongside, and in support of, appropriate local and individual agency Emergency Response plans.

1.3 Purpose of Strategic Framework

To move people and, where appropriate, other living creatures away from actual or potential danger to a place of safety. For this to be carried out safely, and in an appropriate and timely manner, planning needs to be capable of alerting communities and the transient population, moving them, sheltering them, and later supporting them through their eventual return and recovery.

[1] http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk
[2] LRF website under construction, link to be included in next plan update.

The Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 'Large Scale Evacuation Strategic Framework' document contains considerations capable of supporting decision-making processes for an evacuation of people within part, or parts of the LRF, an influx of British Nationals from abroad, and the provision of shelter to evacuees from another LRF area.

The provision of humanitarian assistance, particularly to those with special requirements and vulnerabilities, needs careful consideration and planning. Cohesion between interlinking plans and the responding organisations will be paramount.

Large scale evacuation will always be the last resort and only undertaken when absolutely necessary, and may not be the safest option for the majority of those potentially at risk.

In any decision to evacuate, or not, the over-riding priority must be the safety of the public and the emergency responders.

This framework will consider many diverse and problematical issues resulting from a major evacuation event to assist decision-making processes, but cannot be deemed prescriptive. Planning at the time of such an event will need to remain dynamic and flexible.

Many of the considerations contained within this framework can be utilised to assist evacuation processes on a smaller scale.

1.4 Aim

To develop a flexible multi-agency strategic framework for dealing with the large scale evacuation of people within, out of, or into the LRF area.

1.5 Objectives

- To enable the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) to effectively respond to an event that requires the large scale evacuation of part or all of the LRF
- To identify considerations to support British Nationals and their families evacuated from overseas or an influx of evacuees from areas within the UK
- To provide a process to enable the decision to evacuate or shelter
- To identify considerations to support the shelter decision
- To provide responding organisations with the necessary strategy to allow them to effectively implement their roles and responsibilities in support of an evacuation
- To identify transport and infrastructure considerations to support the evacuation process
- To identify how to access information about vulnerable sites across the LRF that may present particular challenges
- To provide the process by which appropriate information is supplied to all responding agencies, the public, and businesses throughout.

1.6 Contextualisation

Devon is the third largest County in the Country with a population of approximately 741,000 – with 16% living in Exeter. It is bordered by Cornwall to the south, Dorset to the east, and Somerset to the north, and has two separate coastlines that are over 400 miles long at mean high water.

Plymouth is the fifteenth largest urban authority in England and is one of the largest cities on the south coast, with a population of approximately 246,100.

Torbay is the fifth largest principal urban area in the South West and the second largest conurbation south west of Bristol with a population of 137,600.

Cornwall is the second largest county in the region in terms of area with a population of approximately 526,300. It has 700 kilometres of coastline including the lower reaches of the main estuaries, the longest of any English county. To the east, the River Tamar forms Cornwall's border with Devon for all but 18 kms of its length. Evacuation from Cornwall would have a massive impact on Devon, with it being the only county that the people of Cornwall could be moved in to initially. It would therefore be essential to consider a coordinated evacuation by air and sea to ease congestion on the roads, particularly if Devon is also being evacuated.

The Isles of Scilly (IoS) lie 45 km off Lands End and support a population of approximately 2000. Cornwall is the closest coastline; however, impact on this County could be circumvented by transporting the population by sea or air directly to another County or LRF, particularly if Cornwall is being evacuated. Due to its separation from the mainland by sea, specific information pertaining to the IoS can be found at ***Appendix Q*** alongside an individual section within this framework.

During holiday periods, visitors to the South West, increase the resident population by approximately 25+%.

1.7 Scope

Small scale evacuations are defined as up to 1,000 people, medium scale as from 1,000-25,000, large scale as 25,000-100,000, and mass or wide-area evacuation is more than 100,000.

To meet the first criteria, it is intended that local authorities will use rest centre planning. It should be remembered that the majority of evacuees tend to self evacuate and make their own arrangements with family or friends.

For medium scale evacuations, rest centre planning should be capable of being scaled up to meet city centre evacuation planning assumptions. Interlinking city centre evacuation plans must be capable of being scaled up or down and should be flexible enough to be utilised to move significant areas of the population from one part of a County to another. These plans will need to be detailed and robust and will be pivotal in providing the structure required in the majority of lower medium scale evacuations, and will underpin evacuation planning in this LRF[3].

For the high medium, large scale and wide area evacuations, it will be the responsibility of relevant local multi-agency partners (see also ***section 1.13***).

[3] It should be noted that City Centre evacuation plans are in the process of being planned for (led by Devon and Cornwall Constabulary) and will interlink with this plan and local authority rest centre planning once completed.

1.8 Implementation

1.8.1 The decision to activate the LRF 'Large Scale Evacuation and Shelter Strategic Framework' document will be taken by the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). When deciding whether to implement the framework, the SCG should consider:

1. Are local plans sufficient to cope with the proposed evacuation?
2. Is risk to life of remaining in situ assessed to be greater than the risk of a large scale evacuation?
3. Are mutual aid arrangements sufficient to cope with the evacuation?

1.8.2 **When the decision is made to implement this Strategic Framework, early consideration should be given to setting up the following Group to assist Gold Command:**

- **Evacuation Coordination Group –** Dependent on the scenario, this should be made up of appropriate representatives from key and secondary organisations capable of assisting with the decision-making process, chaired by the Police. Even if the decision is to remain in situ, consideration must be given to the possibility of changing agendas.

It is recommended that the Evacuation Coordination Group is set up at the same time, or as soon as is practicably possible, as the:

- **Recovery Group –** It is the responsibility of this Group from the outset to consider return, reoccupation and recovery, chaired by the appropriate Local Authority.
- **Science & Technical Advice Cell (STAC) (or Environment Group) –** chaired by a senior Health Protection Agency (HPA) or National Health Service (NHS) professional, to ensure appropriate arrangements are in place for the provision of essential health advice (both public and environmental).

It is important that these groups do not work in isolation.

Further information should be drawn from the linking LRF Recovery Plan[4], and national associated non-legislative guidance[5], and LRF STAC Plan and National guidance[6].

1.9 Key Stakeholders

- Devon and Cornwall Police
- Local Authorities
- South Western Ambulance Service
- Fire & Rescue Service
- PCT/ Health
- Environment Agency
- Health Protection Agency
- Highways Agency
- Voluntary Sector (represented by British Red Cross)

[4] Recovery Plan under construction by Cornwall Council.
[5] UK Resilience Recovery Guidance http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/response/recovery_guidance.aspx
[6] National Guidance for STAC http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Policyandguidance/Emergencyplanning/DH_073846

1.10 Protective Marking

This framework is not subject to protective marking classification at this time, and is suitable for disclosure under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act.

1.11 Roles and Responsibilities

In most (but not necessarily all) evacuation incidents, the Police will take the lead role. This will usually be in consultation with the Fire and Rescue Service and other partners with relevant expertise such as the Public Health Advisor or Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) if they are available within appropriate timescales (see ***section 1.8***).

Generic roles and responsibilities of responding organisations have been agreed and are described in the LRF's CAERP, and a summary of roles and responsibilities pertaining to this plan can be found at ***Appendix E***.

Regionally agreed roles and responsibilities of the voluntary sector when assisting in emergencies can be found at ***Appendix F***.

1.12 Command and Control

Existing command and control arrangements will be undertaken in line with CAERP, based on the emergency services' system of Gold, Silver, and Bronze.

1.13 Regional Involvement[7]

Planning and response to any large scale evacuation is to be undertaken at local level. However, it is recognised that local plans will become overwhelmed very quickly and, should this occur, coordination and/or pooling of resources via the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) may be required to ensure the region can react swiftly and appropriately.

Triggers for Regional involvement/ formation of RCCC are:

- The numbers being evacuated overwhelm available local arrangements.
- LRF mutual aid agreements are insufficient to cope with the evacuation.
- The implications of the evacuation impacts on multiple LRF areas/regions (***Appendix H***).

1.14 Training and Exercising

This framework should be exercised as part of the LRF training and exercising strategy and should be incorporated, where appropriate, into exercises held for LRF plans.

It is the responsibility of each agency to ensure that their staff are aware of the roles and responsibilities within their organisation and the actions required.

Should there be a requirement for training in any aspects included in this document, they should be brought to the attention of the LRF Training and Exercising Group.

[7] See also 'The SW Regional Response to Large Scale Evacuation'

1.15 Review and Amendment

The 'Large Scale Evacuation and Shelter Strategic Framework' is subject to ongoing audit and review by the LRF to ensure it remains current, reflects good practice, and is fit for purpose. It will be circulated for consultation on completion and incorporates the work of the key stakeholders named within, and by task and finish working groups assisted by relevant secondary stakeholders.

1.16 Key Contacts

It is proposed that the LRF hold 24/7 contact details for all partner organisations and due to the confidential nature of some of these numbers and the non-protective marking of this document the details are not replicated here.

1.17 Equality and Diversity

The importance of delivering services which meet the needs of different communities within Devon, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly is essential. There is legal and moral responsibility at all levels of the response to meet the requirements as laid down under the Race, Gender and the Disability Equality Legislation. Responders should remain mindful and respectful of individuals' human rights and must also recognise the importance of taking into account all six equality strands e.g. Race, Disability, Gender, Age, Sexual Orientation, Religion and Belief and ensuring that these needs are considered[8].

[8] http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/guidance/EqualitiesLegislationStatutoryDutiesofPublicAuthorities/

2 Key Elements of the Process

2.1 Stages of Evacuation

- Decision to evacuate
- Warning & Informing Process
- Shelter in Situ
- Evacuation Process
- Safe Area
- Return, Reoccupation and Recovery



Diagram 1 – The Evacuation Process

2.2 Principles observed

Type of event (stay in situ or evacuate?):

- Scale of event
- Safety and appropriate welfare provision of evacuees and responders
- Activation
- Establishment of a management structure
- Clear definition of roles and responsibilities
- Development of appropriate and flexible interlinking plans
- Effective warning and informing strategy
- Assurance of movement capability
- Establish and maintain confidence and cooperation of the affected community/communities
- Training and exercising of developed plans.

2.3 Timescales

For the purposes of planning, all evacuations may be considered to be one of the two generic types:

Immediate Evacuation – an evacuation resulting from a hazard impact that gives little or no warning, forces immediate action, and gives limited preparation time.

Pre-warned Evacuation – an evacuation resulting from an event that provides adequate warning and does not necessarily limit preparation time, such as flooding and storm surge.

Sudden Impact Event	• People may self evacuate • Responders may not be aware immediately	• Immediate activation of contingency plan • May mean moving those most at risk and sheltering others
Evacuation within hours	Enables some pre planning (access to transport)	• Immediate activation of contingency plan • Limited time to give warning
Planned Evacuation	Timing dependant on circumstances (days or weeks)	• Consideration of contingency plan activation • Use of all warning and informing guidance • Guidance suggests evacuation process to begin as early as possible
Long Term	Threat of future danger enabling research and planning	• Awareness of contingency plan • Time to take actions to mitigate effects

2.4 Risk Assessment

The LRF when considering the Community Risk Register (CRR) consider the likelihood of specific threats, put in place appropriate measures to mitigate the effects of locally acknowledged risks in advance of an emergency occurring - assisted by historical evidence of identified geographic vulnerabilities and lessons, and agree specific risk profiles.

The physical and organisational difficulties of any high-medium to large-scale evacuation should not be underestimated therefore decisions to evacuate, or not, need to be based on a proper assessment of all risks. Evacuation is normally a last resort due to the time it takes and the risks involved, and the decision-making process may not be straightforward as to which option is the safer.

Regardless of timescales, risk assessment(s) must be instigated by the appropriate emergency services and responding organisations. These must be continuously reassessed as the evacuation progresses to incorporate changing circumstances. Consideration will need to be based on the nature and extent of the hazard, the anticipated speed of onset, the number and category of people needing to be evacuated, evacuation priorities, and availability of resources. These considerations should focus on providing, as far as practicable, all the needs of those being evacuated to ensure their safety and on-going welfare, or risk minimisation measures if staying in situ.

Where possible, community risk-assessment is the starting point for planning a risk management strategy.

Risk assessment drives civil protection activities in a way that is directed by and proportionate to risk.

2.5 Decision-making Process and Preparation Activity

It is vital that evacuation is not considered in isolation. The decision to evacuate, or shelter, must be considered by all responding Category 1 organisations. Lines of authority and decision paths need to be clear and understood (***Appendices A & B***), and clarity on the interrelationships of interlinking plans is paramount (***Appendix P***).

As part of the decision-making process, responding agencies need to remember that the loss of staff in the event of a large scale evacuation scenario is also likely, with staff wishing to evacuate their own families to safety. For many more, the problems of getting to the right place to play their part in the response will be highly problematic and logistical dimensions of implementing evacuation and shelter operations, against a background of operational risk and compromised capabilities, must be seriously considered.

Issuing timely instructions to evacuate or shelter and the problem of 'crying wolf' needs to be discussed with partners at a strategic level to assist common understanding of the relevant considerations from a variety of perspectives.

Information management needs to be prioritised, and information-sharing to support planning needs to be well coordinated.

Decisions to evacuate may well be contentious and will be subject to analysis with the benefit of hindsight, and decisions made (or not) may well be challenged in litigation or other processes. It will be necessary, for example, to clearly state to any individual refusing to evacuate the 'consequences' of not doing so. If an individual makes the 'choice' to stay in situ, there can be no guarantee of rescue if the situation deteriorates (see also ***section 2.9*** and ***Appendix J***).

It is critical that a full audit trail of discussions, supporting considerations and decisions (including financial), are fully documented throughout by <u>all</u> responding organisations.

Substantial or complete loss of communications is a real possibility at some point. Where possible, early operational clarity should be given to those on the ground, at bronze level, ensuring they are fully briefed and empowered concerning intended strategic and tactical intentions to enable them to continue to operate towards this end and, if necessary, in some or complete isolation until communication can be restored.

The coordination of the voluntary sector (***Appendix F***) and convergent volunteers must be adequately managed and appropriate processes put in place.

2.6 Inter-agency Communication

General responsibility for communication rests with the Police. The fact that evacuation or shelter is necessary suggests that the area is, or may become, hazardous. This may include people, animals or the environment. See also ***Appendix G***.

The LRF Telecommunications Plan[9] will detail multi-agency arrangements. The primary means of communication between LRF partners is by fixed telephone,

[9] Presently under development

mobile phones or e-mail. Voluntary Sector Agencies such as RAYNET should be called upon to assist if communications fail (see ***Appendix F***). Officers in the field will use mobiles, satellite phones (satphones), AIRWAVE (Police) and radio (Fire & Ambulance).

2.7 Public Warning and Informing

Potential methods for communicating with the public are detailed in ***Appendix I***. Successful communication may depend upon a combination of approaches; they are not mutually exclusive.

It is vital that the content of warnings or other messages do not cause undue alarm. Insufficient information creates confusion, uncertainty and anxiety, and public imagination will tend to fill in the gaps, which can bring about misconception and fear. Messages must be clear and comprehensible to the groups involved, and the purpose and meaning to the message(s) unambiguous. It is important that rumours and sentiments are not given time to spread.

‘

Warnings are more likely to stimulate appropriate public actions if they are issued by a recognised authority[10]. The warnings should, where time permits, be repeated preferably by using more than one delivery method, stating clearly the areas ‘actually’, or ‘likely’, to be affected by the event. A range of methods should be used and should be chosen to fit the time-frame.

Communicating with those who have specific information requirements (e.g. special needs groups or those with limited knowledge of English) needs to be considered in relation to information such as warnings or instructions to evacuate (see also ***section 3.14***).

Coordination of messages that come in and consistency of information being given out, bearing in mind existing documentation, is essential.

Provision of information to evacuees during the evacuation process and subsequent sheltering is vital, including self-help solutions[11].

It must be realised that large numbers of people may decide to self evacuate regardless of advice proffered via media messages/ other informing methods – pre-event, during the event, following the event. The use of variable message signs should be considered to warn and/or inform on arterial routes (see ‘Evacuations by Road’, ***section 3.3*** and ***Appendix T***).

2.8 Shelter in Situ

Evacuation will always be a last resort and will only be undertaken when absolutely necessary.

Evacuation is not an easy option and may not be the safest option for the majority of those potentially at risk. Moving people from established support mechanisms and exposing them to unknown vulnerabilities, will be a disturbing experience for all involved.

[10] Link with LRF Major Incident Media Framework
[11] Preparation for emergencies including self help planning is being progressed through community resilience planning and the LRF Warning and Informing Group.

Although evacuation is considered an important element of emergency response and preparedness which may be effective in many situations, there will be occasions when it may be assessed that people would be safer to 'go in, stay in and tune in' (**see *Appendix A***). Depending on the nature of the hazard, measures such as closing windows, isolation of air conditioning systems, and listening to the radio/ TV to receive information may be the safer option.

Buildings can provide significant protection against most risks and the public may be safer seeking shelter in the nearest suitable building.

In the case of chemical, biological or radiological release, taking shelter would normally be the preferred option, at least during the initial stages.

When considering flood scenarios it may be safer to advise people to seek refuge in the upper storeys of a building rather than run the risk of being overcome by flood waters.

It may well be that a changing scenario will emerge and alter the decision to shelter in situ creating difficult choices for those in command. The safety of the public and the responders must always be paramount and it is important that 'assumptions' are thoroughly scrutinised and that 'decisions' are not made in isolation (see ***section 1.8***, ***diagram at 2.1*** and ***Appendix D***).

2.9 Evacuation

Consideration should be given to possible complications which might influence or affect a timely evacuation process, which should be factored into planning assumptions at the time (this list is not prescriptive):

- More than one area of risk
- Weather - storm surge / heat wave / flooding / temperature
- Transport / infrastructure (see ***section 3.3, 3.5*** and ***Appendix S***)
- Traffic Management (***Appendix T***)
- Time of the day – rush hour, light or dark?
- Public safety (see ***section 3.11***)
- The Vulnerable (***section 3.8*** and ***Appendix C***)
- Public perception
- Public fear
- Communications
- Critical infrastructure (power, water, etc)
- Contamination
- People refusing to leave their properties (***Appendix J***)
- Seasonal transient population
- Lack of responding personnel / BCM
- Pets/ animals (see ***section 3.19*** and ***Appendix O***)
- Food
- Fuel (see ***sub-section 3.5.1***)
- Money
- Water
- Personal belongings

Key considerations to help determine whether evacuation or shelter will be the appropriate option can be found at ***Appendix A***, however, this is not a prescriptive list and it should not replace common sense or appropriate dynamic assessment, particularly in situations involving more than one area of risk.

It will be important to determine whether Evacuation Staging Areas will need to be established at an early stage, to enable the Local Authority (LA) / Local Authorities to put in place arrangements at appropriate location(s), situated a safe distance away from the area(s) of risk. Transport operators will need to be briefed to organise a coach/bus shuttle service to and from the Evacuation Assembly Points (EAP) and the Evacuation Staging Area(s), ensuring the fastest possible evacuation of the affected area(s).

Dependent on the size of the evacuation and the location of the area(s) of risk, all available transport operators, including rail, sea and air, should be contacted to ascertain their capacity to move evacuees out of the area (***Appendices Q & R,*** see also ***Appendix S***).

All appropriate interlinking plans will need to be put into operation as quickly as possible to support the evacuation process (Interlinking LRF Plans at ***Appendix P***).

In the case of individuals deciding to remain in situ when the decision to evacuate has been made (see also ***section 2.5*** and ***Appendix J***), the name of the person and address should be logged and, if time allows, the reason why they will not evacuate. This information must then be shared as quickly as time allows to alert services of individuals' locations, so that if the situation worsens appropriate help can be provided, if available.

If an individual is putting a child at risk by his/her decision not to evacuate, the Local Authority have powers to seek Emergency Protection Orders where children are likely to suffer "significant harm" attributable to the care being given by their parents; if not what might be reasonably expected. However, it is unlikely that it will be appropriate to exercise those powers during a large scale evacuation scenario. The police have powers to remove children under Police Protection Orders which may be more appropriate in these circumstances and would be a decision that would rest with the police at the time.

2.10 Evacuation Assembly Points (EAP)

An area or building of safety, near the scene, where evacuees can initially be directed for assembly prior to being transported to a place of safety.

If the decision to evacuate is made, Evacuation Assembly Point's would be set up by the Police and the location passed to the local authority who will then make arrangements for coach/ bus transport to move people to designated locations away from the area of risk. The warning to evacuate should be given by all possible means, and should include the location of an Evacuation Assembly Point, or points. The Police will manage and co-ordinate the Evacuation Assembly Point(s), assisted by the LA and the voluntary sector.

2.11 Evacuation Briefing Centres (EBC)

In the event of a major evacuation and dependent on timescales, an Evacuation Briefing Centre may be established by the Police. The role of the Evacuation Briefing Centre is to act as a central location for all responding agencies and voluntary organisations to attend to be equipped and briefed before moving out to the Evacuation Assembly Points.

The Evacuation Briefing Centre acts as a BRONZE CONTROL to co-ordinate the activities of the organisations involved in the actual evacuation (see CAERP).

2.12 Evacuation Staging Areas (ESA)

Dependent on its location and size, there is no reason why an Evacuation Briefing Centre should not be co-located with an Evacuation Staging Area. It would be set up by the Police, supported by other organisations. Evacuation Staging Area(s) will preferably include large sheltered areas with plenty of capacity externally to allow for coach drop-off and parking for the public, staff and the emergency services. It is intended that Evacuation Staging Area(s) will assist timely evacuation, freeing up coaches to return to designated Evacuation Assembly Points in areas requiring the immediate movement of people. Evacuation Staging Area(s) will act as short-term places of refuge and should be capable of receiving evacuees prior to dispersing them within or out of the county, or for receiving them into it.

Appropriate signage should be erected on roads to signpost self-evacuating evacuees in need of help or assistance to the Evacuation Staging Area(s). A system to 'meet and greet' evacuees as they arrive should be put in place, and refreshments and food should be available. Where possible, internal signage should be erected, and registration processes completed. The possibility of overnight accommodation should also be considered. (See also ***section 3.7*** and ***Appendix N***)

County show grounds, race courses, football grounds, disused industrial premises, airfields, MoD sites, and motorway service areas could be considered and, if time allows, tented structures on appropriately located green-field sites may need to be an additional consideration, with chemical toilets, communications, and necessary facilities brought in.

In situations where contamination has occurred, de-contamination procedures should, if at all feasible, have been completed prior to evacuees arriving at the Evacuation Staging Area(s). However, these two functions may need to be run simultaneously on the same site to ensure that adequate care is available to those that have been decontaminated. Some pre-located sites are listed within the LRF Strategic Holding Area Plan.

2.13 Evacuation of Enclosed Communities

The NHS and NHS Partnership Trust facilities, Nursing Homes and Residential Homes, and HM Prison Service should all have business continuity plans and Fire Safety planning in place for their sites. However, complete evacuation would provide exceptional challenges. Immediate large-scale evacuation is not possible. In all cases, considerable resources would be required on a regional and possibility national basis.

HM Prison Service will provide the resources to evacuate prisoners to other prisons. Any large scale evacuation will be conducted under the operational command of HM Prison Service Gold Commander.

The Atkinson Unit in Exeter has a contingency plan in place for a full evacuation of the site, agreed by the police and the Local Education Authority (LEA).

See also ***section 2.16***

2.14 Providing Support for British Nationals and their Families Evacuated from Overseas

The needs of people affected in an emergency abroad are similar to any emergency in the UK. The relevant difference is that people are likely to be more widely dispersed within the UK. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office will respond to meet the immediate needs of those affected by emergencies overseas.

Further information is available from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)[12]. (See also ***diagram at section 2.1*** and ***Appendix L***)

2.15 Providing Support to Evacuees from Areas within the UK

This scenario would be the shared responsibility of the LRF in this area. It is advised that multi-agency partners from across the LRF area set up an Evacuation Coordination Group reporting to SMG to deal with the many issues encapsulated in this situation. A comprehensive list of considerations at each stage of the process can be found at ***Appendix K*** (see also ***diagram at section 2.1***). Dependent on the numbers of people requiring shelter, the LRF Evacuation Coordination Group will need to determine the most suitable locations across its length and breadth, and multi-agency partners will need to plan and work together, regardless of borders, to accommodate and care for the people being placed in their care.

It is the responsibility of all organisations to have in place a comprehensive logging system of all information and finances and audit trail.

It may be necessary, if long-term solutions are required, that green field sites are utilised, and that mobile homes/caravans and/or tented accommodation is considered, and, as with large scale evacuation from the LRF area, communities are kept together as much as possible to ensure support mechanisms are retained. Cornwall Council have details of a company called 'Shelter-box[13]' that could provide limited assistance with survival tents, and the British Red Cross have International resources that can be called upon. Additional assistance re shelter solutions may need to be contracted from 'Kenyons' or similar, and assistance from outside the receiving LRF area will be essential to cope with the needs of those requiring help and assistance.

Humanitarian Assistance Centre(s) or similar will be an important consideration, to provide information, signposting and assistance.

It will also be essential to carry out thorough registration processes regardless of whether this has been completed prior to people being received into the care of this LRF area (see also ***section 3.2***).

If the influx of evacuees occurs with little or no notice, consideration concerning shelter solutions in the short-term will in all likelihood need to be fast and diverse, preferably with catering facilities on site (***Appendix N***).

The requirements and care of people being brought into the LRF do not differ from those where people are being taken out of it. Considerations and appropriate decision-making processes discussed within this plan should be applied to ensure that nothing is forgotten.

[12] www.fco.gov.uk

[13] www.shelterbox.org

2.16 Vulnerable Sites

Locations of Acute, Community and Private Hospitals, Mental Health institutions, Prisons, Residential and Nursing Homes in this LRF area are available in the LRF 'Vulnerable Sites Data' document[14], as are the locations of schools.

This document is not intended to replace the gathering of the most up to date information available at the time an incident occurs but will provide quick, timely, and easily accessible information to assist tactical decision-making processes and alert appropriate services to the location of these vulnerable sites within an affected area and the approximate number of people within them.

Accompanying A3 pdf maps detailing site locations must be inserted into the appropriate sections when printed. Each number on the required map corresponds to a site on the list in question.

The LEA has planning in place for evacuation of schools. See also ***section 2.13***.

2.17 Decision to Return

Consideration must also be given to planning for return. Issues to determine this must include whether the risk has passed, who will make the decision and on what basis, and whether critical services and support mechanisms will be available in the relevant areas. This will not occur until such time as multi-agency partners have fully risk assessed all aspects of the return-process, including for example the safety of properties and the environment, alongside rehabilitation and welfare measures that will be required to support the public. (See ***Appendix D***)

2.18 Return, Recovery, Reoccupation

Once the decision to return has been formalised, essential considerations addressed by the Recovery Group will be activated (see also ***Appendix D***). People will want to start returning immediately unless restrictions are put in place.

A 'Safe to Return' statement will need to be issued through the media.

When the evacuated area is wide-spread, the return process may need to be completed using a staged approach/ zoning (for example, residents from a specific area or areas return first). As previously mentioned, much will be dependent on the numbers of people evacuated in the first instance as to how this will be coordinated and safely managed. Some homes may remain uninhabitable, in which case temporary accommodation arrangements will need to have been put in place until alternative housing or shelter arrangements have been identified.

In the case of displaced communities, it is advised that as far as possible communities are not fragmented. By keeping communities together, they will have already established support mechanisms that will help them to cope with the challenges ahead.

A rehabilitation-process must address the psychosocial welfare needs of the evacuees. Many will need assistance with insurers, benefits, their vulnerabilities or special needs, and general welfare support. It should be remembered that no two

[14] CD's available from Devon Conty Council County Emergency Planning Service

people will view or deal with a situation in the same way – it will not be a one size fits all. It is, therefore, vital that the people that have been affected are included in decisions regarding themselves and their communities and their eventual return, recovery, and reoccupation. By giving them choice and keeping them fully appraised of the circumstances, it will better enable them to cope with the situation and empower them to make their own plans and decisions for the future.

Humanitarian Assistance Centre(s) should be opened to provide ongoing advice and access to information, regarding issues pertinent to the return, recovery, and reoccupation processes, for as long as they are required.

3. Key Elements to Support the Process

3.1 All Responders

To:

- Assist investigation
- Keep efficient audit trails using 24 hour clock
- Make available all logs and records as appropriate
- Ensure all incident payments and expenses are accounted for
- Participate in the Lead Police post-incident debriefing process
- Participate in the LRF post – incident debriefing process
- Debrief staff
- Raise Post Incident Report
- Consider their own welfare and, where appropriate, that of their staff during and after an incident
- Ensure that local planning arrangements are amended as necessary.

3.2 Registration Process

The identification and tracking of displaced people is a major challenge. It is therefore important registration is completed as soon as possible following evacuation.

It is anticipated that when Evacuation Staging Areas/ other reception areas are used, best endeavours will be made to complete a registration process and establish who has been evacuated, where they have been evacuated from, and where they are going to – for example, to family and friends, or on to a local authority shelter/ temporary accommodation (and which shelter if more than one) before moving people on. This information will be vital to the Casualty Bureau when trying to locate missing persons and reunite families and loved ones.

If time does not permit, this process should be carried out by the receiving authority within shelter(s)/ temporary accommodation provided to evacuees.

Registration processes are essential, and MUST be completed somewhere.

In the event of an influx of evacuees from other parts of the UK into this LRF area, and prior to moving people to their temporary shelter options, registration should be completed at a receiving area (such as Evacuation Staging Areas, for example) to establish:

- exactly who has been evacuated
- that everyone expected to arrive has done so safely (including staff)
- whether anyone has any specific needs, e.g. sensory, language
- where each individual will be going to – logging destination and contact details accordingly.

3.3 Evacuation by Road

3.3.1 Overview – Whether for the coordination of traffic moving out of the area or for traffic coming in to it, either scenario will have a serious impact on the availability of road networks (see Road Capacity Map at ***Appendix U***, Considerations ***Appendix T***).

Planning assumes that a large proportion of the population within an affected area will self-evacuate prior to the decision to evacuate and will wish to make their own arrangements with family or friends. Traffic management plans will need to be put in place at an early stage in order to try and manage the movement of vehicles and minimise congestion and avoid gridlock.

3.3.2 Road Network Stakeholders:

- The Highways Agency
- Devon and Cornwall Constabulary
- Cornwall Council Highways
- Devon County Council Highways Network Management
- Torbay Council Highways
- Plymouth City Council Highways

3.3.3 Contingency Plans:

- The Highways Agency – has in place comprehensive contingency plans at local, regional and national level that can assist and support evacuation via the high traffic capacity routes in the region that they manage i.e. the all purpose trunk roads A30 and A38, and the M5 motorway.
- Local Authority Highways Departments – have various contingency plans in place for the road networks that they are responsible for.

All Highway Authorities have in place:

- Diversion route plans
- Variable messaging signs that can be utilised to pass essential messages to motorists.

3.3.4 Population and Road Capacity – A map showing population numbers for the main conurbations in the LRF area and the vehicle capacity figures of the main routes, as provided by the Highway Authorities that manage them, is at ***Appendix U***.

3.3.5 Traffic Management – The nature and timing of the evacuation will dictate the exact strategy to be used but large scale evacuation from the region would be Police led at Gold. However, if the decision was taken to evacuate by road, the traffic management could be very complex and it would need to involve all the above stakeholders and their service providers/contractors[15] who maintain and manage their respective road networks.

This document is strategic and it needs to be underpinned by individual tactical traffic management plans compiled by the highways authorities responsible in liaison with the police. It is therefore recommended that this should be a separate area of work supported by the LRF and taken forward by the appropriate agencies in order to ensure a robust and essential linking plan. A list of traffic management issues and considerations can be found at ***Appendix T***.

Evacuation by road from this LRF area would impact on the adjoining Counties and as evacuation is likely to be on the M5 in particular this plan needs to dovetail with the Avon & Somerset LRF Evacuation and Shelter planning.

[15] Contractors details held by respective Highways Authorities

3.4 Crowd Management/ Movement of People

Devon and Cornwall Constabulary have a duty to maintain public order. In the event of a large scale evacuation there is an increased likelihood of public order issues arising.

Due to the nature and potential scale of the incident, it is impossible to predict the location and level of resourcing that might be required. The Gold Commander will assess the situation and priorities for deployment at the time.

There are mutual aid agreements in place for Police Forces across the UK which may be called upon if the situation time-scale allowed.

3.5 Transporting People

3.5.1 Overview – achieving effective transportation is probably one of the greater challenges in evacuation planning. Evidence from the United States of America (Hurricane Rita)[16] states that evacuation plans failed because of excessive reliance on cars with consequent congestion and issues regarding fuel shortages from the surge in demand and premature closure of garages. Also, some families wanted to move all their cars to safety. In addition, many did not have their own cars and could not evacuate themselves at all.

All forms of available transport should be considered at an early stage, including self evacuation.

Dependent on the scale of the incident, fuel supplies may need to be limited to avoid fuel shortages, giving as many people as possible a chance of evacuating by car. Consideration would need to be given to limiting how much fuel evacuees are allowed to purchase – such as, only enough to enable them to reach a place of safety in the first instance and how this could be achieved safely. Policing this would in itself be a massive consideration. It is recommended that the police give due consideration to this scenario in advance of an evacuation event of magnitude.

The issue of transportation is massive as well as critical to the planning process. Without transportation, evacuees can go nowhere, it is therefore vital that careful consideration is given as to how this can be managed and achieved effectively. Dependent on the scale of the incident it is recommended that at an early stage a specific planning group/cell be appointed to deal solely with issues arising from this area of work (Evacuation Coordination Group), supported by representatives from each agency involved within the process and reporting to SCG (see also ***sub-secion 1.8.2*** and ***Appendix S***).

3.5.2 Transport Stakeholders – organisations from land, rail, air and sea were involved in the planning process to ensure all aspects of evacuation were properly considered.

3.5.3 Rail Operators – will run the existing timetable services, to the extent that this is possible under the circumstances. The advantage of this approach is that passengers may be familiar with existing routes and schedules and so, depending on the location of the incident, are likely to know where to go, including alternative

[16] http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/hurricanevacuation/appendixg.htm

options. Additionally the trains and train drivers would already be in the correct places and, therefore, available for continued service should it be needed.

Crowd control at evacuee loading and disembarking points will be managed by the station staff and other transport operator staff in the first instance. However, it is highly likely that the Police may be required to assist where necessary.

Rail Operators have planning in place to provide welfare care teams to assist passengers in their care. (See also ***Appendix S***)

3.5.4 Buses and Coaches - Local Authorities have arrangements in place with bus and coach transport operators, and Local Authorities, the British Red Cross, and St John Ambulance have access to some specialist vehicles equipped for people with disabilities. Consideration will need to be given to the effect of withdrawing transport from established duties e.g. school transport in areas unaffected by the emergency/ or decisions will need to be made concerning which takes president, which could be dependent on the time of day and type of evacuation.

In larger scale evacuations drivers will need clear information and maps because they may be unfamiliar with the route(s), and will need to be fully briefed concerning Evacuation Staging Areas and the requirement to deliver a shuttle service between Evacuation Assembly Points and Evacuation Staging Areas.

Bus Evacuation loading points will need to be established for bus operators, local authorities and the Police, as part of their operational procedures after the hazard zone has been identified. These locations will most probably be Police managed Evacuation Assembly Points, but consideration must be given to safe turning areas for buses/ coaches, sterile routes, and the safety of queuing evacuees. (See also ***Appendix S***.)

3.5.5 Airports – The airports of Exeter, Newquay and Plymouth agree about their positive capability to respond during a large scale evacuation scenario, however, consideration must be given to the planning assumptions highlighted at ***Appendix S***.

3.5.6 Isles of Scilly – Helicopter/ Boat Operators (see ***Section 4*** and ***Appendix Q***).

3.5.7 Mainland – Transport Operators (see ***Appendix R***).

3.5.8 Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and Her Majesty's Coastguard – The MCA has three distinct areas of responsibility. On behalf of the UK Government, it is responsible throughout the UK for co-ordinating search and rescue (SAR) at sea and this is achieved by Her Majesty's Coastguard (HMCG). The Survey and Inspection branch have responsibility for checking that ships meet UK and international safety rules, and the Pollution Response branch are the competent UK authority that responds to incidents of pollution from vessels at sea and offshore installations.

HMCG co-ordinates SAR through its network of 18 Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCC's) throughout the UK. The MRCC's are staffed 24 hours a day 365 days a year. Operations are supported by assets including volunteer Coastguard Rescue Officers (CRO's), Coastguard, Royal Navy (RN) and RAF helicopters, RAF fixed wing aircraft, RNLI Lifeboats and any other air or sea assets that make themselves available in times of an emergency.

Her Majesty's Coastguard's area of responsibility within the SW stretches from Marsland Mouth on the north coast Devon/Cornwall border and comes south to the River Exe. There are 2 Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres, one based at Brixham, Devon, the other at Falmouth, Cornwall.

For a large scale evacuation Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres will, if required by the primary lead agency (the Police), request the tasking of lifeboats through the RNLI, helicopters and fixed wing aircraft through the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) and any additional vessels through harbour and port authorities. Coastguard Sector Managers (SM's) and volunteer Coastguard Rescue Officers may also be offered in support of evacuation operations at a tactical level. We will also endeavour to provide a Coastguard presence at Gold and Silver. The Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres' staff will co-ordinate the rescue efforts of these assets as required.

3.5.9 Port Authorities - Ports and Harbours capacity, whilst dependent on the availability of ships at the time of an event can be assessed on the existing parameters, such as the ability of Plymouth and Falmouth to take the largest vessels at sea whilst smaller harbours dotted around the coast, such as Ilfracombe and Torbay can have very large capacity vessels anchored off but with boarding boats used for evacuation to the ships. The unique position of the Scilly Isles would require practically the sole use of marine transport to evacuate the numbers referred to in this plan, whilst similarly the smallest harbours all around the coast could load to cargo ships, fishing boats or passenger boats. However, the official ability to carry passengers by any vessel and the agreed numbers for those specific vessels, potentially commandeered, whether they be ro-ro ferries cruise liners or cargo ships would depend on the scale of the event and the degree to which "force majeure" is seen to be necessary.

3.6 Military Capabilities

3.6.1 General - No military assets are guaranteed and should not be planned for, with the exception of certain niche capabilities such as RAF Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopter capability and explosives ordnance disposal which would routinely be available. The process for calling in SAR is well understood by Police, Fire Ambulance, and Coastguard. Their effect on any evacuation will depend on the scale and urgency of that evacuation and other incidents/emergencies that may be ongoing at the time.

3.6.2 Command and Control –Military Liaison Officers are embedded within the LRF and its 'crisis' organisation (Gold and Silver) to provide guidance ahead of and during an emergency and to act as the conduit for requests for support.

3.6.3 Search and Rescue – SAR aircraft (RAF, RN and MCA helicopters) would routinely be involved in any major crisis under Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) Cat 'A' (life at risk) procedures, as well as casualty evacuation to a triage point or hospital. They could be used to evacuate limited numbers of uninjured people. They would be tasked by the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) at RAF Kinloss who are contacted via dedicated numbers held in the civil emergency services operations rooms. The Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre can request the assistance of any other Military asset in a SAR emergency. Additionally, the Royal Air Force Regional Liaison Officer (RAFRLO) would normally be tasked into Gold and a specialist Search and Rescue officer into Silver in a major emergency to provide overall 'air' advice and local coordination respectively.

3.6.4 Other Military Aircraft and Road Transport – No military resources are routinely held in anticipation of a UK operation, other than the niche capabilities alluded to above. Any requirement for airlift or road transport from the Military would be put to the RAFRLO or the Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) respectively. However, that requirement would need to be phrased as a requirement to move people from one point to another within specific parameters (e.g. numbers, time, urgency, etc); the Military would determine if they were able to assist and the best means to carry out that movement. Local Authorities would be better placed to facilitate road transport arrangements where possible, as the Military would call on the same civil transport resources and do not 'hold' stocks of coaches or dedicated Personnel Carrying Vehicle (PCV) licence holders.

3.6.5 Use of Airfields – There is nothing to stop Military aircraft using civil airfields and vice versa other than the nature of the runway (load carrying potential, length, navigation aids, weather criteria, fire cover etc). The RAFRLO holds documents which detail all Military and civil airfields and minor airfields, hospitals with helicopter landing sites, etc).

3.6.6 'Air Exclusion Zone' – There are two types of 'exclusion zone':

- Temporary Danger Area (TDA), which the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre can set up within minutes, but will only exclude Military aircraft from a defined area.
- Temporary Restriction of Flying Regulations (TRFR) which takes longer to set up (in excess of one hour) but which will legally exclude all aircraft other than those authorised by the civil police, for example. Temporary Restriction of Flying Regulations can be requested by the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre or the civil emergency services to cover an area which they will determine in coordination with those responders and the Military (RAFRLO and Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre); the Police Air Support Unit will have the information and contacts necessary for Temporary Restriction of Flying Regulations requests, as will the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre. The nature of the incident will determine the area covered by the Temporary Danger Area or Temporary Restriction of Flying Regulations, but it could impact on commercial civil flying.

3.7 Shelter and Accommodation

Identified Rest Centres (RC) will be used where appropriate to support the needs of evacuees. However, during a large scale evacuation event, or when receiving an influx of evacuees from abroad or somewhere else in the United Kingdom, it is expected that these facilities will prove to be totally inadequate to support such large numbers of people effectively.

Much will depend on whether people are to be moved on to more appropriate accommodation within the LRF or away from the LRF area completely, and the speed in which the evacuation needs to be affected. Many deciding factors at the time will drive the decision-making process and determine the course of action taken. Insofar as planning for shelter and requirements for a large scale exodus or influx of evacuees, the Evacuation Staging Area(s) need to be capable of coping with either scenario in the initial stages for an unspecified period of time.

The most likely scenario when dealing with thousands of people will be to locate and house appropriate responding and supporting staff and agency representatives close to the Evacuation Staging Area(s) allowing for shift patterns, to enable the

necessary staffing, shelter, warmth and refreshments, along with welfare aid at these sites to those in need of it for as long as required (see **section 2.12** and ***Appendix N***).

3.8 Assisting Groups with Special Needs

3.8.1 Vulnerable People – evacuation can be a disturbing experience for all involved. However, for a significant proportion of people the experience can be potentially very serious as it removes them from established support mechanisms or exposes particular vulnerabilities.

Cabinet Office guidance documentation considers vulnerable people as those 'that are less able to help themselves in the circumstances of an emergency'[17], which may realistically be many more than anticipated.

During an Evacuation, with high responsibility of self reliance being placed on the public, identifying vulnerable individuals is particularly pertinent. 'All Category 1 & 2 responders should work on the presumption that information requested should be disclosed. Non-disclosure should only occur in exceptional cases such as where there are national security implications.[18]

A schematic to assist the process is at ***Appendix C***.

3.8.2 Who are vulnerable groups? – vulnerability may present itself as a number of consequences, for example:

- Inability to evacuate oneself from a household
- Inability to evacuate those in their care
- Inability to make informed decisions concerning evacuation
- Anyone made vulnerable by the incident.

In terms of planning, vulnerable groups can be broken down into two main categories:

1) 'Known' vulnerable individuals – these are individuals who are known to the health, LA or voluntary sector services such as:

- People with mobility issues
- People with sensory impairment
- People with mental health problems
- People in enclosed communities
- People who are dependants e.g. children
- Asylum seekers.

2.) 'Unknown' vulnerable individuals – These individuals are of particular concern to planners and are amongst the most difficult to both model and reach. Individuals within these groups may be unwilling, or find it difficult to access support, for example:

- Those in the 'Known' category but whom are unknown to the Authorities
- Rough sleepers
- Illegal immigrants
- Gypsy /travelling / showman communities
- Non English speakers
- Those made vulnerable by the incident.

[17] http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/news/vulnerable.aspx
[18] Data Protection Act 1998

3.8.3 General – Devon and Cornwall and IoS LA's, Fire Authorities, Health and some Utilities Companies have identified some vulnerable groups. Developing protocols and policies to describe how this information will be gathered and made available when required will need to be taken forward as a separate area of work by the LRF to take into account Cabinet Office (CO) Guidance 'Identifying People who are Vulnerable in a Crisis'[19]. It will then become an interlinking plan, essential to this planning process. However, vulnerable location planning has been considered alongside this framework document and information can be found in the 'LRF Vulnerable Sites Data' document (see also ***section 2.16***).

Over time it is the intention of LRF to further develop Geographical Information Systems (GIS) to aid risk-based multi-agency planning and structure during an emergency[20] and provide functionality of data by including cross-agency information to highlight additional areas of vulnerability such as flood risk areas, site specific risks, dams, etc, which will become an essential and continuously updated living document. Devon County Council has begun this process and holds mapping for the LRF for the vulnerable sites aluded to above.

3.9 Welfare

The public should not automatically be viewed as victims. The ability of evacuees to provide mutual aid, to coordinate, cooperate, take initiatives and play a leadership role should not be underestimated. Indeed, research suggests that the public could be part of 'the solution' rather than 'the problem'. Empowering people and giving them a sense of purpose can help them to remain focused, strong and healthy, and by neglecting to understand the power of natural resilience, responders could miss an opportunity to make use of a positive resource. People's willingness to help others could provide emergency services with a large pool of highly skilled and potential volunteers. **Convergent volunteers may be utilised but would need to be properly coordinated and managed.**

Throughout, the health and safety of evacuees and responders is paramount and, where applicable, the provision of appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE)/ clothing must be considered. The welfare of staff and their psychological needs should not be forgotten, with consideration being given to appropriate briefings, breaks, shift changes and defusing opportunities.

Defusing is a process which allows the ventilation of feelings by staff after an incident or shift. Ideally, everyone concerned should have the chance to defuse before they go off duty. It is important to emphasise that this process will assist in the alleviation of potential future problems and <u>is not counselling</u>.

During stressful times when leadership is thin on the ground, responders may need to take responsibility for their own health and safety by understanding their own limitations. Any responder suffering anxiety or stress should remove themselves from the task in hand and seek appropriate advice and support, and not put themselves at risk.

[19] LRF planning to be taken forward. For more information see Cabinet Office Guidance "Identifying People who are Vulnerable in a Crisis, Feb 2008. http://www.ukresilience.info/news/vulnerable.aspx.
[20] It should be noted that there is no timeframe set to achieve this piece of work, which will be driven by the Community Risk Register and emerging priorities, and the requirements of this LRF.

The psychosocial wellbeing of traumatised evacuees or staff and their welfare must be incorporated into the process and, where possible, in safe and comfortable conditions. This will not be easy when dealing with such large numbers of people, but thought must be given to managing this important aspect of the response, specifically by ensuring that they are kept fully updated on a regular basis of the situation as it unfolds or develops to help to avoid unnecessary stress. In the event of families being split up, and family members being unsure as to the safety of others, it will be imperative to be able to offer friendly, caring support, and advice as to how loved ones may be traced.

3.10 Contamination

Much will depend on the contaminant, the extent/spread of the contamination, and whether it can be contained.

In the event of a CBRN incident the LRF CBRN plan should be used.

3.11 Public Safety

Devon and Cornwall Constabulary will deploy personnel for public safety operations to support the response activities, and will control the response priority flow along the main evacuation routes out of the affected area.

3.12 Protection of Properties/ Personal Possessions in the Event of Evacuation

Devon and Cornwall Constabulary have a general duty to prevent crime. They will continue to perform this function in the event of a large scale evacuation as far as is reasonably practicable.

However, the Constabulary has finite resources and the Police Gold Commander will need to assess the priorities for deployment based on the information available at the time.

Officers will not be deployed to protect property in any area which may prove hazardous to their health, for example, an evacuated area that has been contaminated with radiation.

There are mutual aid agreements in place for Police Forces across the UK, which may be called upon if the situation time-scale allowed.

3.13 Business Continuity

Individual businesses should consider their own Business Continuity arrangements and have appropriate plans in place. Assistance with this is available via local authority emergency planning departments and should be sought prior to the onset of an emergency occurring. Information leaflets, public awareness events and websites are designed to educate business proprietors.

Category 1 and 2 Responding Agencies, and voluntary sector organisations, should ensure that their own business continuity plans are maintained, sound, robust, and fit for purpose, and capable of supporting a full evacuation of premises, including

vulnerable sites. These plans should include information of expected timescales, and a decision-making process that considers worse case scenarios and avoids assumption.

3.14 Community Cohesion

As previously mentioned within this plan, it is important to consider the needs and supporting mechanisms found within communities and, where possible, keep communities together during longer-term shelter situations.

Segregation of evacuees on racial ethnic and religious grounds is not recommended. However, in extreme circumstances, it may be necessary to provide protection to some communities within the evacuation shelters alongside consideration of alternative arrangements after the initial evacuation has been managed. In instances where intelligence suggests that terrorist activity from extremist minority ethnic groups has been the cause of the evacuation, the SCG should consider how to deal with these issues. Community mediators who have influence and authority might be used to help to establish dialogue and reduce tension.

Messages for non-English speaking communities are under consideration at a national level by the National CBRN Centre. Local authorities and the police have access to Language Line and have systems in place to assist Faith Communities.

3.15 Mutual Aid

It should not be assumed that cross border assistance will be forthcoming. It is the responsibility of the LRF to ensure that mutual aid arrangements have been put in place, as this will be fundamental in ensuring cohesion during the event. It is the responsibility of RRT to ensure that similar arrangements are in place across LRF boundaries.

3.16 Legal Context

The Plan does not assume that the Government will use emergency powers under the CCA 2004 to facilitate an evacuation. However, the plan does assume that any evacuation will be 'necessary and proportionate in the circumstances' and therefore legally defensible.

'The law can be used by one public authority to elicit information from another. Public Authorities have an implicit duty of cooperation in the discharge of public functions which should facilitate public flow.[21]

Individual responding agencies should ensure that their own plans cover legal requirements such as working hours and data protection, as well as insurance/ indemnity cover (for example for LA's responsible for shelter provision).

Law and Evacuation is also covered in ***Appendix M***.

3.17 Financial

[21] Freedom of Information Act 2000

The Local Government Act 1972 enables local authorities to incur 'such expenditure as they consider necessary in taking action themselves which is calculated to avert, alleviate or eradicate in their area or among its inhabitants, the effects or potential effects of the emergency or disaster'.

There are a number of organisations and funding schemes available through the UK Government for extraordinary financial costs resulting from an emergency and recovery for example the Bellwin Scheme[22]. Many government departments have various grants and funding schemes and LA's should liaise with the relevant Government Office (GO). Other European funding schemes may offer assistance, such as the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF).

Dependent on the cause of the evacuation, LA's may be able to recover costs from third parties, for example a polluter once proved responsible.

For Counter Terrorism incidents, the Government has in the past set up specific compensation arrangements, although this cannot be guaranteed.

A clear and precise audit trail from the outset for all concerned is essential.

3.18 Media

See interlinking LRF 'Major Incident Media Framework'.

3.19 Animal Considerations

3.19.1 Pets and Livestock – The Animal Welfare Act, 2006 places a duty of care on anyone taking responsibility for the care of animals. This also applies to dog pounds or rescue centres that will carry the legal responsibility for the animals in their care. This law has particular implications for evacuation. Evacuees who are told to leave their animals at home and evacuate will leave an obligation on those requesting that action to care for the animals. It is therefore important to give evacuees choice regarding the evacuation of their pets so that pets remain their responsibility. Pet owners need a range of information to assist them to make plans before the emergency happens. Anyone deciding to leave animals at home should ensure sufficient food and water is available and that local authorities have been informed. The RSPCA will do all they can to coordinate the care of pets stranded at home. A summary of issues and suggestions is given at ***Appendix O***.

During small scale evacuations, Rest Centres provide very basic care for a few animals, however, during large scale evacuations consideration needs to be given to more effective ways of organising the shelter and care of pets. Dependent on numbers, timescales, and the speed with which an evacuation must be carried out, transit points where the RSPCA could provide advice and information for owners and give them the opportunity to make their own contingency arrangements might be of assistance. It should be remembered that the owners must remain responsible for the care of their pets throughout – however, assistance with the provision of food and water will fall with the local authority/authorities. NB: Show grounds would make effective transit points for pet owners because of the range of facilities available, however, thought must be given to whether such sites are already being used, for

[22] http://www.local.communities.gov.uk/finance/bellwin/bell078.pdf

example as Evacuation Staging Areas. This should not necessarily preclude the two considerations being run simultaneously.

Livestock – will probably remain where they are or be driven to higher ground in flood scenarios. The movement of such animals is covered by legislation which prevents the transfer of animals to other farms/ land, which may be relaxed during a major evacuation event to save life, however it would be up to DEFRA to advise, and would be dependent on whether there are any major restrictions in place at the time such as foot and mouth.

In most cases, it is anticipated that farmers will probably choose to stay at home. Information to assist farmers to prepare before an emergency should be included in future warning and informing strategies, and be made available on appropriate websites to raise awareness and promote self help.

3.19.2 Exotic and Dangerous Animals (Zoos) – it is anticipated that business continuity and evacuations plans for such sites should be in place.

Under the Zoo Licensing Act 1981, a zoo is defined as being 'an establishment where wild animals are kept for exhibition ... to which members of the public have access, with or without charge for admission, on more than seven days in any period of twelve consecutive months'. Therefore, this definition covers traditional urban zoos, specialist animal collections and aquaria.

Stated within the Act, in order to obtain a license, zoos must maintain an evacuation plan, included within which they will:

- Have identified animals that can easily be evacuated, those animals which are difficult to evacuate and those animals which cannot be evacuated.
- Hold details about pre-agreed arrangements concerning places to which animals would be evacuated – addresses, names, contact details and transport arrangements.
- Include plans for what the zoo will do with those animals that they are unable to evacuate.

4 Specific Considerations – Isles of Scilly

4.1 Evacuation between Islands

The main method for transport between islands is via the commercial passenger boats (see Transport Section for details at ***Appendices Q & S***). The St. Mary's Boatmen's Association currently run 10 boats, each carrying between 72 and 100 passengers, resulting in a combined capacity of just over 800 passengers. In addition, three of the smaller islands have commercial boat operators running craft that can carry up to 100 passengers each (Bryher Boat, St. Agnes & St. Martin's). There are a number of smaller commercial craft licensed to carry up to 12 passengers which could also be used. The time taken to travel between islands varies between 15 and 30 minutes depending on the destination and boat speed. Again, the time of year would be an issue with many of the commercial boats being hauled out in the winter (e.g. St. Mary's Boatmen's Association run only 2 tripper boats, Meridian & Seahorse, November to March). Also rough weather will affect the safety of this mode of transport between the islands.

All five inhabited islands have private terrestrial vehicle transport available and the 2001 census records that 54% of households on the islands have at least one car. The distances on land to be covered in any evacuation effort would not exceed 3 miles and in most cases would be considerably less. This means that for a majority of people it may be as quick to walk (if safe) to evacuation areas, as to wait for vehicular transport to be arranged. For vulnerable people and those less able to walk, in addition to private vehicles, St. Mary's, the largest and most populated island, has a number of commercial taxi firms (approx. 9 people carriers) and a five larger buses.

There are also a number of commercial haulage companies on St. Mary's that could be made use of to help transport equipment (blankets, tents, water, food etc) to places of safety and shelter.

4.2 Evacuation to the Mainland

Whole archipelago evacuation would pose a significant challenge to the islands and we would clearly be looking for considerable assistance, especially if this needed to be effected quickly. Particular considerations would be the time of year, which would very much affect the number of people present on the islands; in the winter months (November to March), the number of visitors would be less but this must be combined with the fact that the passenger ferry is out of service. Weather would also be a significant factor affecting the safety of boat passage and also the possibility of air transportation (no flying in low visibility or very high winds). (See also ***section 1.6*** and ***Appendices Q & S***.)

4.3 Population Figures

A figure of up to 5,500 persons on the islands could be reached in the peak summer months May to September, and certainly full capacity is reached over the Gig Championships weekend at the beginning of May each year. In the winter months, (November to March) visitor numbers are low and many island residents travel away from the islands so that the actual population is likely to be nearer the 2000 mark.

Island	Resident Population[1]	Visitor Bed Space[2]	Notes
St. Mary's	1680	1955	In addition, the harbour master registers an average of 3000 yacht nights per year (each yacht containing an average 4 pax). At capacity, St. Mary's harbour accommodates 100 yachts with max 100-150 elsewhere. Plus approx. 24 cruise ships each summer (up to 1000 pax each).
Tresco	172	161	
Bryher	86	175	
St. Martin's	129	284	
St. Agnes	86	109	
Totals	2153[3, 4]	2684	Yachts max 1000 + cruise ships

[1] Total from 2001 censes (broken down according to proportions in previous census).
[2] 1997 tourist brochure (serviced, self-catering and campsites) – little change since.
[3] According to the 2001 census the population is divided between 881 households.
[4] 2153 is recorded as the resident population in the winter, but this increases to 2619 through the summer with seasonal workers

Resident population figures for St. Mary's can be broken down further by location and time of year.

Time of Year	Hugh Town	Old Town	Rest of the Island	Total Population
Summer	1625	216	325	2166
Winter	1250	166	250	1666

4.4 Vulnerable People

St. Mary's hospital has 11 beds and there is capacity for 14 residents at the islands only residential care home (Park House). In addition, approximately 30 adults are helped to live at home. According to the 2001 census figures 278 people are recorded as suffering from a long-term limiting illness and 110 people recorded their health as 'not good'. These two figures combined amount to 18% of the islands population that may have issues with mobility (the highest proportion in the south west region) and reflect our islands status as a top retirement destination. (See also ***section 3.8*** and ***Appendices C***.)

The Five Islands School has a total of 250 pupils divided between 6 bases; 110 at Carn Thomas Secondary Base on St. Mary's, 115 at the Carn Gwaval Primary Base on St. Mary's and a further 25 children divided between the three off-island primary bases (St. Agnes, St. Martin's and Tresco). During term time, between 20 and 30 pupils are housed at Mundesley Boarding House from Monday to Friday.

4.5 Other Considerations

The two largest areas of conurbation on St. Mary's are Hugh Town and Old Town. These are 3.7-5.8m and 4.3-8m above sea-level respectively and accommodate approximately 85% of the population of St. Mary's between them. Also on Tresco, the majority of accommodation is the low-lying New Grimsby and Dolphin Town areas. Warnings of a possible Tsunami caused by a landslide off La Palma in the

Canaries estimate a wave approximately 10m high hitting the islands from the South West with as much as two weeks and as little as five hours warning.

Areas of High Ground		
Location	**Height ASL[1]**	**Facilities available**
Telegraph, St. Mary's	48	Coastguard Tower, full comms system, numerous houses, farm buildings and sheds.
St. Mary's Airport	36	Landing tarmac, purpose built terminal, various buildings and sheds, full comms system.
The Garrison, St. Mary's	41.5	Large sports field, campsite with showers toilets and generator, several houses and out-buildings.
Buzza Hill, St. Mary's	32	A number of residential properties and buildings, plus the Hospital and Health Centre.
Towns Hill, Tresco	17	A number of residential properties and buildings; Borough Farm 25m (Castle Down 44m, no facilities)
Higher Town, St. Martin's	31	A number of residential properties and buildings (Daymark 34m, no facilities)
Higher Town, St. Agnes	29	A number of residential properties and buildings
The Town, Bryher	21	A number of residential properties and buildings (Shipman Head Down 42m, no facilities)

[1]Metres Above Sea Level.

Decision Making Process

Appendix A

- How much **time** is available?
- What **command and control** arrangements are in place?
- What means of **communication**?
- What **resources** are needed?
- What is the **scale** of the potential evacuation?
- How **complex** is the potential evacuation?
- Are there any **environmental conditions** (e.g. bad weather or darkness) that would hamper an evacuation?
- What are the **health** risks and **special needs** provision?
- Where applicable, what is the **intelligence assessment**?
- What is the **capability** to respond to this and further emergencies?
- What is the **duration** that the potential hazard may exist?
- Maintenance of **critical services** to venues?



Flowchart of the Evacuation Process

Appendix B

As taken from Evacuation and Shelter Guidance Document



Assistance with the Planning Process for the Vulnerable[23]

Appendix C

Identification



Notification of Action Required in an Emergency



Evacuation



Shelter in own Home



[23] As taken from Vulnerable People – GOSW Paper.doc

Shelter in Situ, Evacuation, and Re-occupation Considerations[24]

Appendix D

These lists are by no means exhaustive and should be expanded or amended to take account of the particular circumstances of the incident as it unfolds (see also relevant sections). Setting up an Evacuation Coordination Group at an early stage should be a priority (*section 1.8*). Even if the initial decision is to Stay-in-Situ, consideration needs to be given to the possibility of changing circumstances.

1. Shelter in Situ (see also *section 2.8*)

1	Ascertain the perimeter of the shelter area
2	Ascertain the number of people affected
3	Consider expected timeframe that shelter option may be required and plan accordingly
4	Identify the vulnerable and their support needs (***section 3.8*** and ***Appendix C***)
5	Communication and coordination of messages to the public (linked to incident Gold/ Silver communications strategy), particularly in areas of health advice, practical advice to protect property, etc.
6	Consider methods to distribute; • Food (and where it can be sourced)[25] • Essential items • Baby essentials including dried foods, nappies, steriliser tablets, etc • Drinking water supplies (if disrupted) • 'Grey Water' (for toilet flushing, etc) or alternative arrangements • Medical supplies • Heating – if needed (e.g. blankets or appropriate portable heaters) • Food for pets
7	Method to supply essential domiciliary care services to the vulnerable
8	Consideration of those needing nursing care services at home and how that service may safely be provided. Some may need home oxygen services (liaison with British Oxygen required) or other essential medical support to sustain life
9	Be aware of: • The effect of loss of sewage facilities and contamination issues • The effect of loss of power supplies (particularly on heating, ability to cook, and ability to receive media / phone communications) • Religious / cultural needs
10	Logistical issues around sustained supply of support

2. Evacuation (see *section 2.9*)

1	Assume responsibility for the implementation of all aspects of the evacuation process
2	Ascertain: • The perimeter of the evacuation area • Number of premises to be evacuated • Reason for evacuation • Time scale allowed • Approximate numbers to be evacuated

[24] Original courtesy of Avon and Somerset LRF
[25] For example - cooking/self heating food packs http://www.heatermeals.co.uk/emergency.htm to those without gas/electricity, or using 'meals on wheels' service to prepare hot meals

	• Identification of vulnerable persons (***section 3.8*** and ***Appendix C***) • Premises having internal "safe" areas (e.g., providing shelter from bomb incidents) • Method of communication between agencies • Weather and time of day/night
3	Will Evacuation Staging Areas be required?
4	Consider method(s) of evacuation to be used, for example sea, land and/ or air?
5	Liaise with Silver regarding: • Method of evacuation • Safe routes from area • Sterile routes for emergency vehicles and buses/coaches providing shuttle services between evacuation assembly points and staging areas, where possible
6	Identify communication strategy to evacuees
7	Identify suitable evacuation assembly point(s)
8	Consider zoning/ sectorisation and definition of perimeter
9	Arrange for necessary personnel and transport availability
10	Location of Rest Centres/ Evacuation Staging Area(s)
11	Transportation of evacuees
12	Rest Centre/ Evacuation Staging Area police liaison officers
13	Evacuation teams including support teams for Evacuation Assembly Points
14	Registration of evacuees
15	Facilities for evacuees (telephones, feeding, welfare, medical support etc.)
16	Provision of information on the progress of the incident
17	All partners identifying known vulnerable persons within the evacuation area - special transport arrangements may be required (see also ***section 3.8*** and ***Appendix C***).
18	Brief officers and other partners ensuring that they are aware of: - • Reasons for the evacuation • Time scale • Assembly point locations • Method of evacuation and routes • Sectors, if applicable • Location of Evacuation Staging Area(s)
19	Inform casualty bureau (if established) of areas evacuated and the location of safe areas established
20	Liaise with casualty bureau regarding methods of updating casualty bureau with information about evacuees
21	Establish and maintain regular communications with: • Incident control post (if established) • Evacuation assembly point(s) • Rest centre/ Evacuation Staging Area liaison officers • Evacuation teams • All multi-agency partners
22	Crime prevention strategy to ensure security of evacuated premises
23	Liaise with relevant agencies to make arrangements for welfare of animals and pets
24	In a prolonged incident, the SCG Group may need to function over a significant period of time. Members will need to arrange and brief deputies to ensure that the group can continue to function effectively
25	In a prolonged incident, and where possible, keeping communities together
26	Media strategy

2. Reoccupation (see *section 2.18*)

When the emphasis transfers from evacuation to recovery and reoccupation the relevant local authority/ authorities will take over responsibility. Issues to consider include:

1	Who is to pay in relation to any costs incurred?
2	Damage survey/ nature of any repair work necessary
3	Safety of utilities/ action required
4	Sufficient working materials (tools etc.) are available
5	Rehabilitation of evacuees, particularly the vulnerable
6	Ensuring no friction occurs between repair teams working together on appropriate tasks e.g. the army have different working methods to those of civilian personnel
7	Ensuring areas to be worked in, or returned to, are safe and warn accordingly of any likely dangers
8	Consideration of evacuee response to the damage to their properties and cater accordingly: Services in place to assist with emotional distress: • Establishment of advice and support centres/ Humanitarian Assistance Centre(s) in localities giving comprehensive advice. Lists of 'trusted' repair personnel may be appropriate • Public information campaign giving relevant advice and information/helpline numbers • Consideration of public perception regarding approach to local authority tenants versus those in private accommodation
9	Assessing possible day/ time evacuees may return to their homes or properties. Need to take into account the potentially widespread locations of evacuees. Clear public information is needed and a phased return may be appropriate
10	Arranging transport to homes/ properties
11	Providing advice on safety aspects as far as possible, together with crime prevention advice should evacuees subsequently decide to vacate their properties for a longer period
12	Follow-up visits to the homes via local authority staff and/ or police community officers
13	Consideration re management of Appeal Fund by Red Cross Disaster Appeal Scheme

Roles and Responsibilities[26]

Appendix E

1. **Evacuation**
2. **Receiving at UK Airports**
3. **Onward Movement**
4. **Shelter**

1. Evacuation

ORGANISATION	ISSUE
Police	• Decision to evacuate • Initiate notice to partners • Operational control • Traffic management/ Road blocks/ Cordons[27] • Crowd Control/Public Order especially at transport hubs/Evacuation Assembly Points • Warning & Informing the public • Set up Evacuation Staging Areas • Casualty Bureau • Deployment of Family Liaison Officers (FLO) - (if required)
Highways Agency	On motorways and all purpose trunk roads: • Monitor traffic using CCTV, on-road patrols and automated systems • Respond to incidents and provide traffic management • Remove debris and broken down vehicles from the road • Implement diversion routes when roads are closed • Set both local and strategic Variable Message Signs (VMS) to provide information to the public • Provide emergency customer welfare for motorists trapped in traffic (in conjunction with BRC, WRVS and RSPCA) • Assist with warning & informing through live traffic updates on HA's Traffic England web site & Traffic Radio.
Local Authority/ Authorities	• Transportation (including co-ordination of transport operators) • Where possible, support to police at Evacuation Assembly Points • Assist police in identifying and setting up appropriate Evacuation Staging Areas • Identification of vulnerable persons and appropriate support mechanisms • Warning & Informing the public • Co-ordination of voluntary sector support • Organisation for the care for evacuees and their pets • Social and Welfare needs

[26] Original courtesy of Avon and Somerset LRF

[27] Police unable to force evacuation, however, in the event of a terrorist incident the Police can enforce evacuation of an inner cordon area. Oct 07' Court of Appeal ruling on Austin vs MPS relating to containment of crowd within a cordon during May Day 01' demonstrations. Judgment: Police had no alternative but to impose and enforce the cordon. Support for eventuality of holding contaminated people in cordon.

ORGANISATION	ISSUE
	• Temporary accommodation • Environmental Health • Highways Department(s) (keep highways open, provide specific local knowledge) • Children's homes (including secure facilities) • Residential and Nursing Homes • Schools (duty of care, 'In Loco Parentis' duty) • Establish mutual aid arrangements
Fire and Rescue Service	• Saving life • Decontamination prior to evacuation to 'cold zone' (if relevant) • Risk Assessments • Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and Water Search and Rescue • Making safe for return
Ambulance Service	• Patient transport arrangements • Care of casualties • Interface with NHS • Co-ordination of services undertaken by BRC/ St John/private sector
Voluntary Sector	• See ***Appendix F*** NB: Voluntary Agencies will assist as far as possible given the scale of the emergency/potential calls for assistance from a wide area.
DEFRA	• Livestock
Health Service	• Hospital evacuation • Provision of medical support for triage
Health Protection Agency	• Public health support and advice to NHS organisations and other agencies • Impartial and authoritative advice to health professionals • Specialist input to the STAC
PCT	• Assistance at ESA(s) • Lost medication
MCA	• Provide support and resources • Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) coordination • Evacuation from vessels • Some inland SAR
Military	• Aid on request via MACA (potentially of huge significance, but usual caveats must, and do apply, DO NOT RELY ON MACA) - see also ***section 3.6***

2. Receiving at UK airports

ORGANISATION	ISSUE
Local Authority	• Registration • Co-ordination of voluntary sector support • Specialist support to vulnerable persons

	• Multi-lingual support
Airport Authority	• Reception facilities • Flight and manifest information (via FCO) – see also ***Appendix S***
HPA	• Infection Control
PCT	• Assistance at ESA(s) • Lost medication
FCO	• Registration processes & procedures
Financial institutions	• Access to sterling currency
Department for Children Schools and Families (DCSF)	• School registration
Voluntary Sector	• See ***Appendix F*** NB: Voluntary Agencies will assist as far as possible given the scale of the emergency/potential calls for assistance from a wide area.
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP)	• Registration for/ access to benefits

3. Onward movement

ORGANISATION	ISSUE
Police	• Crowd Control/ Public Order especially at transport hubs/ Evacuation Assembly Points • Casualty Bureau (if required) • Deployment of FLO's (if required)
Highways Agency	• Same as '1' (Evacuation)
Local Authority	• Accommodation arrangements • Feeding and refreshments • Transportation (co-ordination of transport operators) • Co-ordination of voluntary sector support (including specialist transport arrangements) • Welfare • Assistance with pets
Ambulance Service	• Patient transport arrangements • Care of casualties • Co-ordination of services undertaken by BRC/ St John/ private sector
Voluntary sector	• See ***Appendix F*** NB: Voluntary Agencies will assist as far as possible given the scale of the emergency/potential calls for assistance from a wide area.

4. Shelter

ORGANISATION	ISSUE
Local Authority	• Rest centres/ other shelter options / Evacuation Staging Areas/ temporary accommodation • Equipment and resources • Reception arrangements • Registration • Welfare and psychosocial support • Food and Refreshments • Co-ordination of voluntary sector support (including limited medical aid) • Organisation for the care/ welfare of pets • Environmental Health • Clothing
PCT	• Assistance at Evacuation Staging Area(s) • Access to GP and prescription arrangements (lost medication)
Police	• Public order (inc. particular difficulties surrounding the use of dependencies whilst in group accommodation) • Liaison between relevant accommodation site(s) and casualty bureau • Media control
DWP	• Registration for/ access to benefits
DCSF	• School registration (if displaced at distance from normal home location)
Voluntary sector	• See ***Appendix F*** NB: Voluntary Agencies will assist as far as possible given the scale of the emergency/potential calls for assistance from a wide area.

It will be the responsibility of each responding service or organisation to ensure the welfare of their staff.

Roles and Responsibilities of the Voluntary Sector in an Emergency[28]

Appendix F

BRITISH RED CROSS
(non religious)

General
Provision of emotional and practical support – befriending, listening, signposting
Provision of short term medical loans i.e. wheelchairs
Procurement and/or provision of supplies (i.e. clothing and blankets)
Escort, accompany and transport non-seriously injured survivors, evacuees, family and friends
International message and tracing
Management of disaster appeals and funds

Survivor reception centre
First Aid
Provision of emotional and practical support
Assistance with registration/other recording needs

Rest centre/F&FRC/HAC
Practical and emotional support – befriending, listening and sign-posting
First Aid
Reception duties
Procurement and/or provision of supplies (i.e. clothing, bedding and blankets)

Accident and Emergency Departments
Practical and emotional support as above
Reception duties

CRUSE BEREAVEMENT CARE
(non religious)

FFRC/HAC/SRC
Support and counselling to those affected by a death

DISASTER ACTION
(non religious)

General
Advice to victims regarding:
- How to form support groups
- Bureaucratic and legal issues
- Referral to psychological specialists

Advice to emergency planners regarding preparedness and the response

FAITH LEADERS
(multi faith)

General
Support, counseling and 'signposting' information

[28] As agreed at a regional level

SRC/Scene of incident Attend to give emotional support to survivors/workers at scene ***Rest centre/ FFRC/ HAC*** Any task requested, dependent upon resources available Support staff and volunteers as well as those involved with the incident, at all locations. ***Emergency Mortuary*** Escort, practical, emotional and religious support for victim's relatives
RSPCA (non religious) ***General*** Collection and short-term housing of pets
RAYNET (non religious) ***General*** Delivery of third party messages via amateur radio Mobile radio control room facility Mobile radio stations
ROTARY CLUBS (non religious) ***Rest centre*** Any support tasks requested, dependent upon resources available
ST JOHN AMBULANCE (non religious) ***General*** Paramedics and registered nurses Ambulances for the transport of injured survivors Mobile First Aid posts Radio communications ***Survivor reception centre*** First Aid ***Rest centre/FFRC/HAC*** First Aid
SALVATION ARMY (considered multi faith) ***General*** Emergency Feeding and food distribution Shelter Housing Missing person enquiry service

Escorts on transport from an Evacuation Assembly Point to an Emergency Centre
Any other tasks requested, dependant upon resources available at the time

Rest centre/FFRC/HAC
Counselling service
Emergency Mortuary
Escort, practical and emotional support for victim's relatives

THE SAMARITANS
(non religious)

General
Long term emotional support to victims

FFRC/HAC
Emotional support for victims or distressed individuals

VICTIM SUPPORT
(non religious)

General
Long term emotional support to victims of crime

WESSEX 4X4 RESPONSE (Devon, Dorset, Somerset & Wiltshire)
(non Religious)

General
Logistical support under both normal and adverse road and weather conditions, including towing/ transport of equipment for other agencies
Provision of 4x4 vehicles, trailers, small boats (with safety equipment) and 7.5 tonne MAN Horsebox (can be used as catering vehicle, sleeping accommodation or command unit
Amateur radio communication

WRVS
(non religious)

General
Practical and emotional support – meeting/greeting, befriending, listening and sign-posting
Rest centre/FFRC/HAC
Providing/assisting with providing refreshments
Registration of evacuees
Reception duties
General organisation and establishment of centres
Rest Centre management by previous agreement

Key:

FFRC – Family & Friends Reception Centre
HAC – Humanitarian Assistance Centre
SRC – Survivors Reception Centre

Communication Structure[29]

Appendix G



[29] As assisted by Government Office South West

Evacuation Process and Alert Mechanism for the RCCC[30]

Appendix H

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT/ STAND BY	INITIATE EVACUATION	
Advance notice given that major incident may occur, or contributing factors to an ongoing incident may result in large scale evacuation.	Responding agencies initiate planned procedures but evacuation and shelter arrangements considered to be contained within LRF border.	Numbers to be evacuated/sheltered require multiple LRF involvement and outside of the scope of local planning.
RCCC LEVEL 1	**RCCC LEVEL 1**	**RCCC LEVEL 2**
• LRFs undertake initial discussions to manage the impact of large scale evacuation if required. • Warning and Informing plan initiated.		• LRFs initiate local evacuation and shelter plans • Transport availability co-ordinated • Evacuation and receiving assembly points co-ordinated • Warning & Informing strategies co-ordinated

[30] Taken from Regional Evacuation and Shelter document

Methods of Communication[31]

Appendix I

Method	Commentary
Door to door calling by police and/or partner agencies	• High confidence that message has been delivered successfully. • Gives excellent public reassurance. • Opportunity for response from members of the public as to their intended actions. • Message can be tailored to different geographical areas if necessary. • Can be combined with a leaflet 'drop' to leave information with residents if time permits. • Staff cannot be deployed into dangerous or hazardous conditions without appropriate training and PPE. • Need to ensure message is given uniformly, particularly if large numbers of staff are deployed - good briefing essential. • Very resource intensive for large areas.
Media message (TV /radio)	• Quick way to deliver message to large areas of population. • Minimum drain on responders' resources, allowing deployment elsewhere. • No opportunity for gauging public response. • Low confidence that individuals have received message. • Reliant on infrastructure (e.g. public having access to power supply for TV or radio). • More difficult to predict public reaction than through personal delivery - may cause panic. • Automated Message Services. • Very quick way of delivering a targeted message. • Can provide confidence that message has been delivered, but not how public will react. • Requires infrastructure to be functioning. • Wider issues around automated messages are still being considered at a National level; however the Flood Watch system operated by the Environment Agency is in place.
Mobile loudhailer **Announce-ments/ Helicopter Sky Shout**	• Message can be reasonably well targeted to a particular area. • Delivery is quicker than door-to-door method. • Not reliant upon infrastructure other than physical access. • Some opportunity to gauge public response. • Staff cannot be deployed into dangerous or hazardous conditions without appropriate training and PPE. • Air support loudhailer. • Message can be delivered to medium size area relatively quickly. • Not reliant upon ground level infrastructure. • Low confidence that message has been received. • Possibility of causing panic as method would be visually dramatic. • Incident, lack of availability or weather may restrict the aircrafts ability to fly.

[31] Original courtesy of Avon and Somerset LRF

Method	Commentary
Variable Message Signs (VMS)	• On the VMS on the motorway and trunk road network, the HA National Traffic Control Centre sets strategic messages and the SW Regional Control Centre sets tactical messages. Both Control Centres operate 24/7. Additionally the HA Service Providers have some mobile VMS that they can deploy to sites as necessary. • Highways Local Authority Control Centre(s) can provide up to date and timely information 24/07 to travelling public on A roads not managed by the Highways Agency. • Delivery of immediate warning and informing messages. • Traffic flow management. • Provision of advice on diversion routes.
Websites	• Ensuring the most up to date available information at local (where possible), regional and national levels (were applicable) • HA's Traffic England – 24/7 live information on the current situation on the HA's road network.
Helplines	• Incident-specific 24 hour call centres • Highways Agency Information Line HAIL for the public to use 24/7.

Reasons for Individuals to Refuse to Evacuate[32]

Appendix J

Reason for Refusal to Leave	Action to Mitigate
Concern about family members and a wish to wait for their return or their contact	• Early warning about evacuation • Publication of helpline for family separated by the emergency • Comprehensive information to evacuees • Registration of evacuees at Evacuee Assembly Points and Rest Centres
Lack of trust in alerting authority. An unwillingness to believe that a danger exists.	• Public awareness strategy regarding major incidents • Coordinated messages to evacuees with sound media strategy to inform • Use of trusted community figures to support the evacuation process (particularly relevant to town/parish emergency plans. • Use of appropriate ID
Complacency from previous hoaxes or false alarms	• Examination of hoaxes and false alarms to learn from the experience • Media strategy to assist cooperation following the hoax or false alarm • Use of trusted community figures as above
Unable to leave because of physical, psychological, psychiatric or other needs	• Humanitarian Assistance sub group development regarding identification of the vulnerable within communities • Coordinated planned response to address specific needs Town/Parish emergency planning (where available) to assist in identification of vulnerable in local communities
Unwillingness to close a business	• Business continuity information to businesses to prepare • Crime Prevention information before and during the evacuation • Information to businesses following evacuation
Unwillingness to leave a pet	• Planning includes care of pets in an evacuation • Clear messages to evacuees regarding arrangements for pets (in situ or elsewhere)
Lack of transport	• Transport capabilities identified including public, private and voluntary agency sources • Clear information regarding evacuee assembly points
Concern for safety of property	• Pre event crime prevention strategy including advice to householders in evacuation
Confusion regarding arrangements. Where do I go?	• Early identification of Evacuee Assembly Points • Coordinated message to evacuees using multiple means/ languages relevant to area

[32] Original courtesy of Avon and Somerset LRF

Considerations Regarding Influx of Evacuees from Areas within the UK[33]

Appendix K

Establish:	
• Reasons for evacuation • Duration (if known) • Numbers and population breakdown -age, culture, disability, etc (if known) • Other LRF areas supporting evacuees • Determine financial support available to assist • Determine likely mutual aid available to assist	Will determine possible needs (level of trauma, etc) Will affect arrangements needing to be made RRT Liaison is important In areas unaffected (if any)
Potential arrival points	Support needed
Determine possible locations for settlement including setting up of temporary shelters, such as tentage on greenfield sites (see also ***Appendix N***).	• Rest Centre capability considered • Community Impact Analysis • Determine locations for support of those with specific vulnerabilities or needs • Determine those needing help alongside those with family or friends/not needing assistance
Determine Media strategy	
Evacuation Needs – Short Term:	
• Registration system • Triage on arrival • Organisation for supply of prescription medicines/supply of glasses etc • Arrangements for food/water/clothing/essential supplies • Advice/information regarding benefits/immediate monies • Assistance with transport • Ability to cope with different languages and reflect cultural needs • Faith support • Arrangements for emotional/psychological support • Consideration of accompanying pets • Arrangements for unaccompanied minors • Communications strategy	Clothing appeals generally do not work, however British Red Cross will open their stores to assist in the provision of clothing for evacuees (if required) Crisis Support Teams if available Social Care Support including Voluntary Agency support
Evacuation Needs – Longer Term:	
• Organisation for ongoing medical support, i.e. access to Dentist/Opticians/Medication, etc • Access to other government support including employment • Consideration of educational needs of children (financial support for uniforms etc)	Recognition of importance of keeping family groups and community groups together for support

[33] Original courtesy of Avon and Somerset LRF

• Consideration of more permanent accommodation • Ongoing communications strategy • Ongoing psychological/ emotional support	
Potential establishment of a HAC or advice centre(s)	Information, signposting, assistance

Considerations for British Nationals and Their Families Evacuated from Overseas[34]

Appendix L

Issues	Organisations
Early warning of anticipated numbers (where possible)	Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO)
Focus on immediate Needs:	
• Medical	• Ambulance Service (paramedics at scene if required) • British Red Cross and St John Ambulance (basic medical/equipment needs) • Primary Care Trust (lost medication)
• Financial (no money)	Department for Work & Pensions
• Physical (disability, hearing impairment, visually impaired)	Local Authority
• No documentation	Home Office
• Lack of basic equipment (pushchairs, clothing etc)	Local Authority
• Transport to Rail Station or other	Local Authority
• Assessment of needs/ escort for Minors/ assistance with elderly frail	Local Authority
• Emotional Support & Advocacy	Local Authority/Voluntary Agencies
• Coordination of Media	Coordinated by Police
• Language Difficulties	Local Authorities / Police /Voluntary Agencies/ Faith Groups
Liaison with Central Government/ other government departments/ LRF's	Regional Resilience Team
Ongoing Needs:	
Rest Centre Accommodation and support	Local Authority
Coordination of alternative accommodation (for those unable to help themselves)	Local Authority
Information to access future support including psychological support (Helpline Numbers, etc)	British Red Cross/ Local Authority
Consideration of Humanitarian Assistance Centre(s)	Local Authority
Liaison with relevant Local Authorities receiving evacuees	RRF via LRF's.

[34] Original courtesy of Avon and Somerset LRF

The Law and Evacuation[35]

Appendix M

(General Information – Specific advice should always be sought)

Subject	Text	Further Information
Enforcement of Evacuation	Generally not mandatory ➢ Terrorism – statutory powers to cordon off areas ➢ Health – People can be contained for public health reasons	Terrorism Act 2000 Section 33 Public Health Act 1984
Emergency Powers	Government Responsibility - Generally will not be used to facilitate an evacuation	Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Part 2
Provision of temporary shelter	Local Authority Responsibility – general powers to provide temporary shelter	Local Government Act 1972 Section 138 and Local Government Act 2000 section 2
Assisting the Homeless	Local Authority duty to assist people who are homeless or likely to be homeless including from flood, fire or other disaster	The Housing Act 1996 Part 7. Also see – Evacuation and Shelter Guidance (HM Government) Page 42 ' Homelessness Legislation'
Safeguarding and promoting the Welfare of Children	Local Authority, Prison, NHS and Police have duties to safeguard children	Education Act 2002 (guidance) www.dfes.gov.uk/educationact2002/. Children Act 2004 (guidance) www.everychildmatters.gov.uk/strategy/guidance
Animal Welfare	Duty of care on anyone responsible for animals to take reasonable steps to ensure their needs are met. Includes owner of the animal/ someone in charge on a temporary basis. Where there is time or opportunity to relieve suffering (pre or during evacuation) this should be done	➢ Animal Health & Welfare Act 2006 ➢ Zoo Licensing Act 1981 ➢ Wildlife & Countryside Act 1981 (to prevent release of non native species) ➢ Agriculture Act 1968 & The Welfare of Farmed Animals Regulations 2000 Also advice from DEFRA, RSPCA, and Local Government Animal Health
Health and Safety of Responders	Employers are required to ensure, as reasonably practicable, a safe place of work and working practices. Assessment of risk required. Applies to H&S of volunteers	The Working Time (Amendment) Regulations 2003 Section 4 clarifies flexibility in emergency situations Health & Safety at Work Act 1974
Sharing Personal Information	Guidance available regarding sharing of information in emergency situations	Data Protection Act 1998 Guidance in 'Data Protection & Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders' HM Government 2007 Available on www.ukresilience/publications

[35] Original courtesy of Avon and Somerset LRF

Shelter Considerations[36]

Appendix N

(Will vary according to type, size, and duration of incident)

Building Type - Explore	Advantage
General	
Local Authority will need to coordinate additional assistance e.g. First Aid, food and refreshments, welfare support, etc, in the majority of the following options:	
Hotels & Bed and Breakfast	No staffing implications
Commercial Venues including: ➢ Race courses ➢ Football/ Rugby stadiums ➢ Show grounds ➢ Golf clubs ➢ Recreational and festival sites ➢ Motorway service areas	➢ Green field sites can be utilised to support tents, marques, mobile homes, caravans and temporary structures ➢ Can usually access their own staffing and additional logistics to support large numbers of people ➢ Canteen facilities ➢ Possible space for animals
Commercial Venues including: ➢ Entertainment venues ➢ Conference centres	➢ As above – may not have green field site options and space for pets
University and/or campus, private and boarding schools	➢ If outside of term-time have dormitories that can be utilised ➢ Canteen facilities ➢ Often with large grounds and good catering facilities ➢ Sports fields can be utilised to support tents, marques, and temporary structures ➢ Possible space for animals
Churches	➢ Clergy likely to be able to access assistance from the Church Community
Rural Areas	
Village Halls – particularly in areas supported by Parish Emergency Plans	➢ District Councils hold lists of venues used for polling stations ➢ Parish Councils could be approached to organise assistance
Seasonal holiday accommodation including camping and caravanning sites	➢ Holiday makers could be sent home in season to make room for those in need/ out of season facilities would be empty ➢ Staffing on site during holiday season ➢ Heating may be an issue ➢ Normally have shower facilities ➢ Sports fields can be utilised to support tents, marques, and temporary structures ➢ Possible space for animals

[36] Original courtesy of Avon and Somerset LRF

Livestock and Pets[37]

Appendix O

Consideration	Comment/Issues	Solution/Actions	Advice from
Domestic Pets	Evacuees likely to be unwilling to leave without their pets	Evacuation Notices to include information for owners of pets covering:- • Leaving your pet (what to leave and who to inform) • Taking your pet (what to take with you and where to go)	RSPCA liaising with Animal Charities
Assistance with Evacuated Pets	Rest Centres offer limited care facilities	• Source additional food and pet care materials • Advice to evacuees regarding alternative accommodation for/with Pets including Kennels, Friends & Relatives, Pet Friendly Hotels	RSPCA Liaising with Animal Charities
Care Of Pets remaining at home	Dependant on information from evacuees	• Coordination of care/rescue package	RSPCA
Livestock Cattle	Farmers & Cattle likely to remain in situ. Issues – Contamination of land. Disruption of water supply	• Information to Farmers regarding water sources etc • Advice to Farmers regarding care of cattle in an emergency • Ultimately, steps may need to be taken to prevent suffering	DEFRA Animal Health Animal Health (Local Authority) RSPCA National Farmer's Union (NFU)
Horses	Owners unlikely to leave their horses	• Information as above • Explore alternative stabling	RSPCA British Horse Society & World Horse Welfare
Animal Movement	Means of Transport likely to be limited	• Call Off Agreements with Hauliers • Consideration of Animal Movement restrictions	DEFRA has agreements in place DEFRA has contingency plans for this eventuality

[37] Original courtesy of Avon and Somerset LRF

Linking LRF Emergency Plans

Appendix P

Combined Agency Emergency Response Protocol (CAERP)

Flooding

Devon Flood Warning & Response Plan
Cornwall Flood Response Plan
LRF Strategic Flood Plan (Draft)

Major Incident Plans (Devon):
Barnstaple
Bideford
Dartmouth
Exeter
Exmouth
Newton Abbot
Kingsteinton
Paignton
Teignmouth & Shaldon
Tiverton
Totnes
Plympton & Marsh Mills
Barbican
Sidmouth
Seaton

Major Incident Plans (Cornwall):
Penryn
Truro
Bodmin
Camelford
Padstow
Wadebridge
Par
St Blazey
Bude & Stratton
Helston
Perranporth
Launceston

Miscellaneous

LRF Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) Plan
LRF Fuel Shortage Plan (Draft)
LRF Information Sharing Protocol (Draft)

Human Health Emergency Planning Group

LRF Flu Pandemic Plan
LRF Mass Casualty Plan (Draft)
LRF Mass Vaccination Plan (Draft)

Humanitarian Assistance / Evacuation & Shelter

LRF Humanitarian Assistance Centre Plan
LRF Large Scale Evacuation and Shelter Strategic Framework

LRF Vulnerable Sites Data (2009)

Vulnerable People Plan (Under Development)

Plymouth City Centre Evacuation Plan (Draft)

Devon Faith Communities Emergency Plan (Under Development)

LRF Survivor and Family and Friends Reception Centre Plan (Draft)

Telecommunications Resilience

LRF Telecomms Resilience Plan (Draft)

CBRN

LRF CBRN Plan
LRF Strategic Holding Area Plan (Draft)

Mass Fatalities

LRF Mass Fatalities Guidance
Emergency Mortuary Plan (Draft)
LRF Excess Deaths Plan (Draft)

Warning & Informing

LRF Major Incident Media Framework
LRF Major Incident Media Strategy (Draft)
LFR Self Help Leaflet and Household Emergency Plan (Draft)

Recovery & Site Clearance

LRF Recovery & Site Clearance Plan (Draft)

Local Search & Rescue

LSARC Silver Cell Plan (Draft)

Animal Diseases

DEFRA Contingency Plan for Exotic Animal Diseases

Individual Responder Agency Local Plans for Animal Disease

Coastal Pollution

Local Authority Coastal Pollution Plans

Isles of Scilly – Transport Operators

Appendix Q

The main routes on and off the islands are summarised in the table below.

Craft	Company	Capacity	Departure Point	Commercial Destinations	Notes
Ship – Scillonian III	IoSSC[1]	18 crew, 600 pax (67m length, 2.89m draught)	St. Mary's Quay (March – November only)	Penzance Quay (2hr 40 min	Housed Penzance overnight – minimum 6 hour turn around
Ship – Gry Maritha	IoSSC	5 crew, 12 pax + freight storage (37.6m length, 2.9m draught)	St. Mary's Quay (year round)	Penzance Quay (4hr)	Housed Penzance overnight
Fixed Wing Aircraft - Islanders x 3	IoSSC	1 pilot, 8 pax	St. Mary's Airport	Landsend (15 min)	None housed on Scilly overnight. Can go further? Min turn around?
Fixed Wing Aircraft – Twin Otters x 3	IoSSC	2 pilots, 17-19 pax	St. Mary's Airport	Landsend (15 min), Newquay (30 min), Exeter (60 min), Bristol (70 min) & Southampton (90 min)	None housed on Scilly overnight.
Helicopter - Sikorsky S61 x 2	BIH[2]	2 pilots & a flight attendant, max 30 pax	St. Mary's Airport, Tresco Heliport	Penzance Heliport (20 min)	Housed Penzance overnight. Min turn around?
* In addition, a number of smaller private/ commercial boats could be used in an emergency situation to transport people away from the islands.					

[1]Isles of Scilly Steamship Company
[2]British International Helicopters

Mainland – Transport Operators

Appendix R

Company	Available Vehicles	Capacity	Departure Points	Usual Destinations	Notes
Air Southwest	Dash 8-300s	Dash 8-300s - 50	Newquay and Plymouth City Airports	UK Destinations – Bristol, Gatwick, Leeds, Newcastle, Manchester and Glasgow	
Flybe	14 Embraer 195s 45 Bombardier DH8-Q400s	Embraers - 118 Bombardiers - 78	Exeter and Newquay Airports only	UK Destinations – Gatwick, Leeds, Newcastle, Manchester, Norwich, Aberdeen, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Inverness	
Military	No resources routinely available – Search and Rescue aircraft could be used for evacuation of casualties, and perhaps limited numbers of uninjured people.				Military should always be the resource of last resort and cannot be relied upon to provide support. Liaison officers at Gold and Silver could provide guidance at the time.
Cross Country Trains	Scheduled services only (no extra rolling stock available)		Main stations – Exeter St Davids, Plymouth, Penzance. Others include Newton Abbot, Paignton, Truro, St Austell, Tiverton Parkway	Main Centres – Bristol Temple Meads, Cheltenham, Birmingham New Street, Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, York, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow.	
First Great Western	Scheduled services only (no extra rolling stock available)		Main stations – Exeter St Davids, Plymouth, Penzance, Truro, Newton Abbot.	Main Centres – London Paddington, Reading, Bristol Temple Meads, Cardiff Central,	

			Services to Barnstaple, Falmouth, Newquay, St Ives and Paignton	Worcester, Gloucester and Cheltenham.	
Stagecoach Devon	313 buses in total across region.	Vehicles of varying sizes with capacities ranging from 16 – 92. Total capacity of fleet – 14,953	Bus stops across Devon, including all major centres such as Exeter, Plymouth, Torbay, Barnstaple, Newton Abbot, Tiverton and Bideford and routes in between.	Bus stops across Devon, including Plymouth and Torbay.	
Plymouth City Bus	130 buses in total – combination of minibuses, midibus/dart type buses and double deckers	Minibuses – 25 Midibus/Dart type – 40 Double Decker – 75	Bus stops in Greater Plymouth area	Bus stops in Greater Plymouth area	

Note: Local Authorities have links to all bus and coach companies

Considerations Relating to Methods Of Transportation

Appendix S

General	Consult with Department for Transport (DfT) who oversee all transport services across the board	
	Type of incident	
	Intelligence	
	Numbers of people needing evacuation	
	Time factors	
	Weather conditions	
	Staffing levels and capability (will additional assistance be needed to support transport operators from other organisations and in what capacity?)	
	Availability of essential equipment	
	Availability of necessary resources	
	Who needs to be evacuated first (e.g. hospitals)?	
	Consider the incoming needs/ care/ resources/ equipment/ requirements of people at the receiving end, when evacuating them out	
	Unexpected arrival of people that have not been planned for	
	Decide where you want people to go to and the direction you want them to take	
	Clear messages, directions and signage required to avoid confusion at an early stage	
	Rendezvous points for responders and evacuation assembly points for evacuees	
	Sterile routes where needed to assist movement if possible	
	Car parking/ coach parking	
	Staff deserting posts to self evacuate selves and families	
	If evacuating out of the area, stop services coming in	
	Infrastructure breakdowns – power, electric, water, etc, could affect preferred options/actions	
Air	If terrorist incident, evacuees will not be evacuated by aircraft due to heightened security measures	
	General security measures will be dependent on circumstances. Operators are required to abide by the National Aviation Security Programme unless the circumstances require a waiver from the Department for Transport (DfT) – Transport Security (TRANSEC) to be consulted at the time. Questions to be considered: ➢ Can airport(s) be closed to incoming flights and divert those on route to keep the airport(s) clear for evacuation purposes? ➢ Can airport security be relaxed? ➢ Can evacuees be 'drip fed' to provide 'filtered' arrivals (i.e. not all together)? ➢ Can evacuees be 'remotely' checked in at Evacuation Staging Area(s) to save time on arrival at the airport, thus providing a faster throughput? ➢ Can evacuees be accepted without ID (as this may not have been brought with them)?	
	Terminal capacity (size): ➢ Plymouth	Dash 8 - 50 seat capacity, can currently accommodate 6 parked planes and has 1 large and 2 smaller hangers

	➢ Exeter ➢ Newquay	Can take all plane sizes with space for 15 parked aircraft - if pressed could accommodate more. Most of the planes take 185–200 people except 747's which take more As Exeter - having space developed in the 2009 for 4 737s (200 capacity each)
	Terminal opening hours: ➢ Plymouth ➢ Exeter ➢ Newquay	 0600 – 2230 24 hours except Saturday when 0700 – 2300 0600 – 2200 These hours can be extended if staff are on site, however, air traffic controllers are on strict working hours, as are pilots (without either of these there can be no flights)
	Terminal building capacity (people): ➢ Plymouth ➢ Exeter ➢ Newquay	 200 800-1,000 600
	Processing times (flights and people): ➢ Plymouth ➢ Exeter ➢ Newquay	 4 flights and hour (approximately 200 people) 13 flights and hour (approximately 2,500 people) 8 flights an hour (approximately 1,500 people) If more aircraft could be brought in and the staffing and resources put in place to support the process, these figures could be greatly increased
	Parking for additional aircraft can be accommodated on all sites	
	Flybe could operate additional flights through Exeter and Newquay airports, but cannot use Plymouth	
	Flybe has additional capacity within the flying programme for extra staffing to run an increased schedule/look after increased number of passengers. This can be used if the situation demanded an emergency evacuation	
	Size of aircraft that can use the airfield - A larger capacity aircraft may be feasible if no luggage on board (shorter take off area required)	
	Military aircraft and civil aircraft can use each others landing areas/sites in an emergency (see also ***section 3.6.4***)	
	Need for traffic management and crowd control at the airport (people and vehicles). Assistance would be needed with additional staff from outside agencies for this and marshalling	
	Fuel: ➢ Airports are capable of operating without power (back up systems in place) – reliant on available fuel supplies ➢ Incoming support aircraft are capable of flying internal flights without refuelling at the evacuation site if fully fuelled prior to take off ➢ Less fuel would be used if people travel without luggage	
	Problems would occur and effective evacuation would be hampered if private aircraft owners decided to evacuate themselves and their families at the same time as an evacuation occurring at an airport	
	A minimum number of fire service staff is required at an airport for licensed flights to operate. However, as the passengers will not be fare paying this may count as unlicensed movement, and therefore a full compliment of fire	

	service staff may not be required. Guidance would be needed on this from the Department for Transport dependent on circumstances
	If flights are classified as unlicensed movement then alternative airfields could be used such as Dunkerswell, RNAS Culdrose and RMB Chivenor
	Using smaller airports e.g. Dunkerswell: ➢ Plenty of space and good runway facilities ➢ This may not be appropriate for evacuation via larger planes, as essential equipment to board evacuees would not be available. This should not rule out consideration of the site(s) which have good facilities and could be considered as a receiving area
	To get people away from an area quickly they need to be able bodied – other transport, such as helicopters should be considered for the disabled
	Medical evacuations require specialist aircraft
	The Isles of Scilly could use air evacuation to other parts of the UK direct and bypass this LRF area
	Consideration should be given to moving trained staff from one airport to another, when not all airports are required to support an evacuation process
	Airlines have their own emergency planning group, and the Airports Emergency Issues Group (AEIG) meetings are chaired by County Emergency Planning Manager IoS, consultation with this group may be advantageous
	Problems of terminal capacities when bringing people in to the region would require assistance from other organisations
	Immigration and customs issues if bringing UK Nationals back from abroad and airports do not have a permanent customs presence
Sea	The right weather conditions essential
	The Isles of Scilly could use sea evacuation to other parts of the UK direct and bypass this LRF area
	Large parts of Cornwall could use sea evacuation as well as air to avoid using road networks into and through Devon if Devon also affected and evacuating
	Brittany and P&O Ferries: ➢ Brittany Ferries not cooperative when approached re assistance for this scenario. DfT would need to be involved if this service was deemed essential to support evacuation. ➢ P&O could be approached – they could be in the area in 6-10 hours The Scillonian – Isles of Scilly Travel (see also ***Appendix Q***): ➢ Operates out of the Scilly Isles accommodating 600 passengers
	Royal Navy ships (CINC Fleet) – dependent on which available at the time, Strategic Coordinating Group would need to contact Commander in Chief of the Fleet to determine availability
	Commandeering of passenger ships a possible consideration
	RNLI – x12 large lifeboats with capacity for 138 people and x19 smaller vessels with capacity capability of 2-3 people
	Use of tripper boats – MCA holds details ➢ Regulations from MCA on numbers of passengers
	There are approximately 1000+ local operators in the region that could be approached
	Use of Sealink catamarans is a possibility – capacity for 100s of people – they operate from Poole and Weymouth
	Consider use of smaller ports
	Embarkation points – there could be congestion problems in Plymouth
	Possible use of any passenger liners in Southampton at the time of evacuation

Rail	Rail network is private property
	Network Rail own the tracks and train operators pay to operate trains upon them
	If flooding incident trains will not be running if lines affected
	Operators in LRF area are Cross Country Trains, First Great Western, and South West Trains
	British Transport Police (BTP) ➢ National police force for the rail network ➢ Manpower is limited ➢ There are manned stations in Exeter, Plymouth and Truro ➢ In the event of an incident arising were more than one station requires a police presence, mutual aid would be sought from across the UK, it therefore depends on the timescales of the incident ➢ In the event that the train operating company or their agents lose control of any crowd management process put in place to deal with a planned event, the police will intervene and take over control until the situation is resolved. The same principles apply for an unplanned event ➢ BTP only have access to police cordon tape ➢ BTP will support the train operators by providing police presence in order to deal with any public order issues arising due to the volume of people attending with an expectation of travel
	Large numbers of people arriving at a station with an expectation of travel will require management to ensure both public and staff safety within the railway environment with particular regard to platform overcrowding and the regulation of queues
	Crowd and passenger management at railway stations is the responsibility of the train operating company operating the railway station
	The sourcing and supply of equipment such as crowd control barriers is the responsibility of the train operator of the railway station concerned. Any requirement for such equipment will be passed through the station manager of that station
	There is no capacity for extra trains or carriages/rolling stock to be added
	Approximate numbers of people that can be transported on a single train is 70-600 and will vary according to number of rolling stock available
	Gold would need Cabinet Office decision to stop passengers boarding timetabled services that are coming into the area in order to utilise the empty trains to collect evacuees and take them out of it
	Problems would occur re overcrowding with health and safety issues and the need for first aid
	Public order issues at stations – there would be a BTP presence but there are not many officers in the Devon and Cornwall area – Police assistance would be required
	Each operator has their own customer service / incident care teams that will deal with the welfare of passengers involved in rail incidents only. They are all volunteers and could not necessarily be mobilised immediately
	Stations only tend to have about 10 staff present at any one time and some of the smallest stations have no staff – this could cause operational problems
Road	Assessment by the relevant Highway Authorities of the current situation on the roads it is proposing to use as evacuation routes (i.e. impact of current weather conditions or major traffic incidents). Car users must be controlled, alongside adequate signage and clear

	messages (see also Traffic Management at ***Appendices T & U*** and ***section 3.3***)
	Local Authorities Transport Departments hold contact details for bus and coach operators, which are also held by Emergency Planning Departments for out of hours mobilisation. Dependent on vehicle and driver availability
	Taxi's could be considered for evacuation of sensory impaired and their carers, guide or hearing dogs, and known vulnerable frail adults in first instance
	Specialist vehicles/ buses and taxi's capable of transporting the disabled should be used for this use only in the first instance (British Red Cross and St John may also be able to assist) ➢ DCC – 45 wheelchair accessible cars and 135 welfare buses with tail-lift ➢ Torbay – 33 welfare minibuses ➢ All operators have low floor buses
	Numbers of passengers in coaches/buses is dependent on the bus. Minibuses can transport on average 25 people, Midibus/Dart type vehicles 40, and double deck vehicles 75.
	No luggage other than essentials will allow further space for people
	Communication for drivers - dedicated telephone lines to give drivers access to a control point to pass messages/ book available/ find out where to go next
	Consideration of fuel supplies: ➢ Priority to vehicles assisting the evacuation process ➢ Limiting fuel to private vehicles – enough to reach a place of safety
	Cancellation of normal bus services and utilisation of the vehicles
	Assembly pick up points specific to requirements
	Where feasible and to assist the evacuation process, consideration of sterile routes for emergency vehicles and for coaches/buses moving between evacuation assembly points and evacuation staging areas
	Devon Preservation Society buses stored at Winkleigh could be used
	Staffing levels as drivers will self evacuate – although managers and training staff all have licenses
	Not many spare vehicles kept by bus/coach operators, however there is 'some' spare capacity – this will be dependent on available drivers

Considerations Relating to Mainland Evacuation by Road & for Traffic Management[38] [39]

Appendix T

Given the linear length of the LRF area it has been agreed that there would be merit in working on a traffic management plan for large scale evacuation from the region which would in all probability be via the M5 into Somerset. Therefore Avon & Somerset LRF and adjoining Local Highways Authorities in Somerset would also need to be part of that Group. Devon and Cornwall Police endorse this view.

Volume and density of traffic evacuating from the region onto trunk roads and motorway that have limited capacity, will be a major challenge and will require careful planning. Information and considerations contained in this matrix are intended to assist with this process.

Agency	Information to consider
General	*The main concerns to consider are:*
	- The number of vehicles and resulting traffic density - Prioritisation of routes - Impact on the strategic road network - Capacity and alternative routes - Welfare of motorists in vehicles potentially for long periods of time on the network - Keeping routes open and traffic moving - Clearing accidents from the network - Clear and concise communication advice to the public for evacuating by road (including what to take with them, and car sharing where possible) - Conveying messages through the media as well as variable messaging signs, etc - Pinch points, e.g. Penn Inn roundabout - Are any sterile routes needed? - Preventing vehicles coming in to the area - Required road closures - Information about fuel (***section 3.5.1***) - Consideration re transporting people without their own vehicles (***Appendix S***) and management of this - Use of CCTV cameras wherever available to monitor - Close communication with the Evacuation Coordination Group (***section 1.8***) where the HA and LHA representatives should be working alongside transport operators and relevant others on behalf of Gold - Vulnerable groups (***section 3.8*** and ***Appendix C***)
The Highways Agency (HA)	Strategic roads governed by the HA – A30, A35, A38, and M5
	Plans in place to support a large scale evacuation are:

[38] Current Plans are robust but large scale evacuation would be a unique situation and not business as usual. Therefore, a tactical traffic management group, with representatives from all SW Highway Authorities & the Police, to produce a plan for large scale evacuation to enhance the resilience of the region. It is intended that this will be progressed in the future to link with this framework and other planning processes.

[39] Information and considerations taken from a traffic management survey completed by each Highways organisation

Agency	Information to consider
	A32 Area Service Provider Contingency Plan covers A30 Exeter to Honiton and A35 to the Bere Regis roundabout in Dorset. **Area 1 Service Provider Contingency Plan** covers A30 & A38 in Devon & Cornwall. **Area 2 Service Provider Contingency Plan** covers motorways and APTRs in Somerset & Avon, Wiltshire & Gloucestershire but also the M5 in Devon. If there was a major incident requiring the Highways Agency Board to support, the HA would implement the **National Crisis Management Plan**. HA & ACPO have jointly developed a **Traffic Incident Management Guidance Framework** and this comprehensive document sets out their respective roles & responsibilities including those for major incidents. The HA's has an **Emergency Customer Welfare Policy** for providing assistance for stranded motorists.
	Other plans to support evacuation by road:
	Off Network Tactical Diversion Routes – Tactical Diversion Route Document (TDRD) is part of each Area Service Provider Contingency Plans. Reference Information Document (RID) is part of each Area Service Provider Contingency Plans and contains a raft of information on the network that would be useful to a Tactical Management Team. Detailed Local Operating Agreements DLOAs (referred to within the Local Traffic Authority National Guidance Framework 2007). These are Partnership Working Arrangements between the HA's National Traffic Control Centre and partners/stakeholders. DLOAs cover operational issues including setting Variable Message Signing & Strategic Diversion Routes. Individual agreements exist with: - D&C Police - Cornwall Council - The Tamar Bridge and Torpoint Ferry Joint Committee - Devon County Council - Torbay Council - Plymouth City Council
	Available signage to support large scale evacuation:
	The National Traffic Control Centre (NTCC) and the South West Regional Control Centre (SWRCC) can both set driver information messages on the Variable Message Signs (VMS) on our network. The Area 1 & Area 2 Service Providers (SPs) have mobile VMS signs that can be deployed to locations on the network. SPs can arrange for temporary signs for the roadside to be made and erected.
	Monitoring systems, e.g. CCTV:
	CCTV The SW Regional Control Centre (SWRCC) is the centre for all communications regarding incidents and monitors the HA's network through CCTV coverage of a significant part the motorway and trunk roads. Area 1 & Area 2 Service Provider Network Control Centres also have some CCTV coverage. Live Reporting The HA has Highways Agency Information Line which takes calls from

Agency	Information to consider	
	the public and is therefore a live information source. HA Traffic Officers patrol the motorways and they report back to the SWRCC Control Room on situations on the network. Area 1 & Area 2 Service Provider Incident Support Units on the motorway & trunk road network are another information source	
Local Authorities	*Strategic roads governed by:*	
	Devon	Devon Strategic Highway Network
	Cornwall	All roads in Cornwall apart from A30 and A38
	Torbay	A380 and A385
	Plymouth	A386, A379 and A374
	None of the LA Highways Departments have specific plans for a large scale evacuation scenario	
	Plans in place to support evacuation by road:	
	Devon	Devon Flood Warning and Response Plan. Road Hierarchy supports this function. Standard diversion routes are in place for the A361 and Trunk Road/Motorway Network
	Cornwall	Cornwall Flood Plan
	Torbay	Diversion route has been agreed with Devon in relation to a closure of the A380 Newton Road
	Plymouth	A draft Network Management Plan and strategic use of the UTC Control room to control the routes
	Available signage to support large scale evacuation:	
	Devon	Current deployment is 6 large variable message signs (VMS) around Exeter. It is planned to deploy a further 3 in Newton Abbot, 10 in Barnstaple, and 2 on the A361 North Devon Link in the 2009/10 financial year. Signs are controlled through the Highways Operations Control Centre (HOCC).
	Cornwall	Mostly mobile VMS
	Torbay	None at present, some to be installed 2009/10 financial year
	Plymouth	Fixed sites and 5 more being installed at present-locations /plans to follow
	Monitoring systems, e.g. CCTV:	
	Devon	There are CCTV Cameras in Exeter, Barnstaple, Newton Abbot and Shaldon Bridge. Automatic Number plate recognition cameras with real-time snapshot capability are also deployed at many locations in Exeter, Newton Abbot and Barnstaple with a further deployment planned for Totnes this financial year. CCTV and ANPR cameras are all accessed via the HOCC. A major deployment of Real-Time Traffic Counters is planned over the next five year period on major routes that will provide the HOCC with data on the volume and speed of traffic.
	Cornwall	Little CCTV but use is made of Trafficmaster cameras to monitor network
	Torbay	9 CCTV cameras at major junctions, however, these do not cover all strategic routes
	Plymouth	CCTV at 25 major junctions

Population, Trunk and 'A' Road Capacity Figures Map

Appendix U

The separate pdf of this Map should be inserted after this page when printed

Glossary

ARCC	Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre
BCM	Business Continuity Management
BRC	British Red Cross
BTP	British Transport Police
CAERP	Combined Agency Emergency Response Protocol
CAT	Category
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCA	Civil Contingencies Act 2004
CO	Cabinet Office
CRO	Coastguard Rescue Officer
DCC	Devon County Council
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DPW	Department for Pensions and Work
EA	Environment Agency
EAP	Evacuation Assembly Point
EBC	Evacuation Briefing Centre
ECG	Evacuation Coordination Group
EP	Emergency Planning
ESA	Evacuation Staging Area
EUSF	European Union Solidarity Fund
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FFRC	Family and Friends Reception Centre
FLO	Family Liaison Officer
GIS	Geographical Information System
GO	Government Office
GOSW	Government Office South West
HA	Highways Authority
HAC	Humanitarian Assistance Centre
HMCG	Her Majesties Coast Guard
HO	Home Office
HOCC	Highways Operations Control Centre (Devon)
HPA	Health Protection Agency
ID	Identification
IoS	Isles of Scilly
JRLO	Joint Regional Liaison Officer
LA	Local Authority
LEA	Local Education Authority
LHA	Local Highways Authority
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
MACA	Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
MACC	Military Aid to the Civil Community
MCA	Maritime and Coastguard Agency
MRCC	Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre
NFU	National Farmers Union
NHS	National Health Service
NTCC	National Traffic Control Centre
PCT	Primary Care Trust
PCV	Personnel Carrying Vehicle
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment

RAF	Royal Air Force
RAFRLO	Royal Air Force Regional Liaison Officer
RC	Rest Centre
RCCC	Regional Civil Contingencies Committee
RN	Royal Navy
RRT	Regional Resilience Team
SAR	Search and Rescue
SCG	Strategic Coordinating Group
SHA	Strategic Health Authority
SITREP	Situation Report
Situ	Situation
SM	Sector Manager (for the Coast Guard)
SRC	Survivor Reception Centre
STAC	Science and Technology Advice Cell
TDA	Temporary Danger Area
TRFR	Temporary Restriction of Flying Regulations
W&I	Warning and Informing

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SW Regional Response to Large Scale Evacuation

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